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Common Sense or Commonwealth? 
The Fence Law and Institutional 
Change in the Postbellum South 
1\y SHAWN EVERITT KANToR and]. MoRGAN KoussER 
~REI.Y IIAVF. SOU111F.RN IIISTORIANS DEVOTED AS MUCII ATTENTION TO A SIMPLB 
question of torts as they have in the instance of fence laws: would owners of 
livestock be held liable for damages to other people's crops if they did not 
fence in their animals (refened to as the "stock law"), or did crop owners 
have to fence out other people's cattle and swine (known as the "fence 
law")? In most of the sparsely settled pre-Civil War South, the open-range, 
or fence-law, position prevailed. Post-Civil War state legislation allowed 
voters in counties or subcounty districts to adopt laws that shifted rights to 
crop growers and town dwellers and away from owners of livestock, which 
effectively closed the range. 1 
Debates over this question, Steven Hahn contends in his sweeping 
reinterpretation of postbellum southern society and politics, reflected 
1 See. t .g., Gtorgia Acts . . . Atljoumtd Smion, 1872, No.329. pp. 34-36. In 1881 militia 
districts were permitted to hold fence dections. See Gtorgia Acts ... 1880-81, No. 401, 
pp. 79-81. In the early postbcllum period the Alabama and Mississippi state legislatures 
passed county-specific acts either allowing county or subcounty referenda or permiuing 
landowners lo petition county officials to enact the stock law. In South Carolina and in 
some counties and militia districu in Georgia, Alabama. and Mississippi. however, the 
stock law was imposed in the late nineteenth century by the stale legislature without 
referenda or petition. See Soulh Carolina Act• .. . 1881-82, No. 472, pp. 591-94, and 
amended, No. 603, p. 854. The Mississippi and Alabama legislatures authorized referenda 
in all counties and aubcounty districts in 1892 and 1903, respectively. See Mwissi/J/Ji 
Acls . .. /892, Chap. 71, pp.l61-66; AlahamaAcb • .. 190), No. 311, pp. 431-38. We wish 
to thank Lance Davis and jean-laurent Rosenthal for help£ul discussions during our work 
on this paper and Doug Flamming and David Weiman Cor extraordinarily help£ul 
commenu on previous versions of this paper. Naturally, we retain strict property rights 
to any of the paper's remaining shortcomings. 
MR. KAJIITOR is an assistant professor of economics at the University of Arizona 
and faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
MR. KoussF.R is a professor of history and social science at the California Institute 
of Technology. 
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struggles between an ~agrarian bourgeoisie," on the one hand, and those 
who believed in ~a cooperative principle that challenged the tenets of 
bourgeois individualism and property, that challenged the hegemony of the 
marketplace," on the other.2 'This was not simply a clash between people or 
classes with different economic interests, Hahn believes, but a full-blown 
culturaVideological struggle: 
What underlay contention over the material consequences of the stock law 
were considerably different, and increasingly antagonistic, ideas about social 
relations and property rights. The freedom to which [stock-law opponents] 
adhered was not merely that founded upon ownership of one's person and 
exchange in the marketplace, but that founded upon control over productive 
resources, labor time, and subsistence which, in tum, could be realized only 
through membership in the commonwealth of producers. The stock-law 
controversy set the republicanism of those producers against the values of the 
free market.' 
To its critics, according to Hahn, the stock law ~was the starkest instance of 
efforts by the emerging postbellwn elite to cast petty producers into a state 
of dependency." Central to Hahn's larger interpretation of the transfonna-
tion of the nineteenth-century upcountry, the fence-law contests, in his 
words, "paved the road to Populism.,. Actually devoting little direct 
attention to Populism itself, Hahn concentrates on two small counties in the 
Georgia hills, Carroll and Jackson. 
In this article, we revisit the battles that Hahn addresses, evaluating his 
and others' hypotheses about fence-law conflicts within the two counties in 
his study. In addition to reexamining the published debate between propo-
nents and opponents of this livestock-enclosure movement, we explicitly 
and rigorously test Hahn's and others' explanations by formulating com-
peting models and assessing them with multivariate statistical methods. We 
fmd more subtlety and Complexity in the debate and the clashes of interest 
than they appear to have in Hahn's presentation. While we do not doubt 
that differences over policy stances and ideology often move people to 
action, we do believe that the importance of such factors must be weighed 
against the evidence in each particular case, rather than automatically 
assumed to be determinative.' In this instance, we show that it is possible to 
1 Hahn, Tilt RooiJ •J Soullltm PopuliJ'IIC f•o•on Fonnns ond lilt TroJUforaolion of tu 
Ctorgio Upcounlry, J8j().J890 (New York and Oxford, 1983), 239-53 (quotations on pp. 
244 and 252). 
1 Ibid., 2!10, 2!15-!14. (Editor'• note: tee Steven Hahn, "Common Cc:nta or Hittorical 
Senoe~· P· 245, and Shawn Everett Kantor and J. Morgan Kouuer, "Two Vision• of 
History," p. 259, note 2, both in thil iuue, for discuuiona o£ this quotation.) 
' Ibid., 259, 240. 
5 Dougl:us C. North, Slnu:lurw an4 C!aanu in EconoMic HiJtory (New Yorlr. and London, 
1981) warns economic historians against arbitrarily asauming "rational" sclf-interell on 
the part of individuals. North ahows that ideological belief• must be equally conoidered 
as motivating factoro in economic or political change. In other worlr., Kou11er emphasize& 
the importance of ideology. Sec "'The Supremacy of Equal Rights': The Struggle Against 
Racial Disuimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundation• of the Four-
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choose between different explanations of motivation, and we argue that the 
conflict was over material, not cultural, matters. 
Hahn is not the firSt to study southern fence laws-not even the first to 
focus on Carroll County. The late James C. Bonner viewed the debate 
mainly as a conflict between "small farmers in isolated areas and those 
living in more densely populated areas."" The pre-Civil War southern 
economy had been almost wholly agricultural. After 1865, periodic depres-
sions, as well as the geographically uneven development of railroads, 
towns, and industries, created a "rural-urban schism" that was manifest in 
the local debate over the fence issue. The Populists' relative success in 
Carroll CoWJty in the 1890s, according to Bonner, was the climactic result 
of the developing class conflicts in the local battles to close the open range.1 
Proposing many of the core ideas later generalized to the entire South and 
expressed more vividly by Hahn, Bonner's 1971 monograph attracted 
much Jess response than Hahn's 1983 work. 
Charles L. Flynn, Jr., also highlights the fence-Jaw debate, which he 
refers to as "the bitterest political issue in Georgia politics between Re-
demption and the Populist Revolt of the 1890s. "1 But instead of a symbolic 
cultural battle, flynn sees the contest as a purely material class conflict 
pitting relatively affluent landowning whites against the landless or land-
poor, white as weU as black. Although he admits the validity of some of the 
arguments of the stock-Jaw proponents, Flynn judges partisans of that 
position "at least indifferent to the burdens that the change placed upon the 
poor."9 Spreading from the more populated, less forested black belt to the 
developing hill counll}', the dispute shifted from a contest predominantly 
between blacks and whites to one primarily between different classes of 
whites. "'The fence-law controversy," flynn contends, "illustrated the inter· 
secting class and racial division in the life of the New South." While 
stock-law advocates wanted to minimize the expense of fencing and the 
property damage caused by marauding animals, fence-law advocates feared 
high charges by landlords and large fanners for the penned, watered 
grazing space that would be necessary if the fence law were repealed. 10 
In n geographically broader review of two centuries of southern grazing 
laws, J. Crawford King, Jr., details the gradual closing of the southern 
range.11 Rather than analyzing each side's stated rationale for acting, King 
leenth Amendment," Nortl11111sltm Uraiwrsily La111 Rnitw, LXXXII (Summer 1988), 941-
1010. 
1 jamea C. Bonner, Gto'(ia ~Las I Froralitr: TAt DtvtlopllltNI •/ Cal'foll County (Atheus, 
Ga., 1971), 14!. 
, lhi4., 139. 
1 Charles L. Flynn, Jr., Whilt Land, Blac• Labor: Caslt and C/4ss ira Lalt Nindflnlh· 
Ctralury Gtorgia (Baton Rouge and London, 1983), 128. 
'lhi4., 131. 
10 1hid., Chap. 5 (quotation on p. 129). 
11 J. Crawrord King, Jr., "The Cloaing orthe Southern Ranse: An Explonlory Stud)·." 
JoumaloJSouiAtm llislory, XLIII (February 1982), 53-70. 
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divides the cotmties of Alabama and Mississippi into those that had either 
partially or completely adopted the stock law by 1890 and those in which 
the open range persisted. Using 1880 census data, he then compares several 
of the objective traits of the two groups of COWlties: population density, 
racial proportions, fann-tenure arrangements and size, intensity of cultiva-
tion and concentration on cotton, and nwnber of livestock (especially hogs) 
per person. Failing to employ any multivariate methods or explicit statisti-
cal models, King presents only a series of contrasts between the mean 
values of each variable in the two sets of coWlties. Although he concludes 
that his results "suggest a much more complex interpretation than the 
simplistic and somewhat artificial picture of battle between 'haves' and 
'have-nots' ,"King does not flesh out such an interpretation himself. 12 
Historians are not the only scholars to notice fence laws. In a now classic 
1960 paper, the economist Ronald H. Coase employs the example of a 
dispute bel\yeen a fanner and a cattle raiser over who should compensate 
the other for the damage caused by livestock in the absence of a fence 
between their adjacent properties.ll In certain circumstances, Coase argues, 
the individuals would voiWltarily come to an agreement that would maxi-
mize the value of what the two of them produced, regardless of who 
initially owned the grazing rights. A cooperative Coasian solution might 
not take place, however, if there were too many potential partie!! to the 
agreement. More bargainers would multiply the difficulty of gaining infor-
mation about each individual's true preferences and behavior and therefore 
complicate the negotiation and enforcement of any contract.•• The same 
difficulties that would Wldermine a free-market solution would have a 
similar effect on a voiWltary conununitarian arrangement, Wlless every 
person in the conununity were altruistic, since non-altruists would have 
strong incentives to take advantage of their fellows' generosity. 15 
This probable contractual breakdown can be particularly disastrous in 
what natural resource economists refer to as "corrunon pool" situations. 16 If 
"Ibid ., 63-70 (quotation on p. 68). 
" Ronald H . Coas~. "Thr Problem of Soc:ial Cost, • journal of Law and Econornics, Ill 
(Onob~r 1960), 1-H. 
" Economists rrf~r to such difficuhi~s as "transaction costs, • which include th~ costs 
o£ bargaining, information, supervision, enforcemenc, measureme111, and political ac· 
lion. On~ of Coase's crucial assumptions, and, implicitly, one of Hahn'• (s~c RooiJ of 
Soulhtrn PopuliJm, 252-53, on •th~ abiding logic ofthr op~n range"), is that transaction 
cosh ore n~gligihle . Srr Elizah~th Hoffman and Mallh~w 1.. Spitzrr, "Th~ Coas~ Theo-
rem: Som~ Exprrimcntal Trsu,· journal of l.aw and Economics, XXV (April 1982), 73 for 
a11 ~x.haustive list of Coase's a~sumptions . It is instructive that the arch -laiss~z-fair~ 
th('orist and tht' radical historian share tl1e z~~:ro -transaction<O!\ts assumption. 
" It is surprising that Coasr and llahn should ~mphasizr th~ voluntary and/or 
commuuilarian as~cts of the fenc~~:- law strucrure, for lhe tradi1ional historical view is that 
requiring crops, rather than animals, to be fenced often fo!ltered biller, incessant 
conflicts. s~~. t .g., Earl W. Hayt~r. ·u,·ruock-Frncing Conflicts in Rural America," 
Agricultural ffiJtory, X.XXVII (January 1963), 10- 20. 
16 II . Scoll Cordon, "Th~ Economic Theory of a Couunon-Proprrty Rcsourcr: The 
Fishery." journal of Political Econom1, LXII (April 195·1), 121-42. 
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flshennen do not consider the effect of their current actions on the welfare 
of others or themselves in the future, they may quickly deplete the resource. 
As long as the pond is overstocked, no hwnan suffers. But if the supply of 
fish falls below a certain point, then every fish caught by one person is a 
meal denied to another. If the supply declines to a point below the replace-
ment level, every fish taken hurts not only individuals other than the one 
fishing, but the society as a whole. Similarly, under the fence law, the 
owners of grazing animals could let them nm free on other peoples' land. 
This law therefore encouraged stock raisers to increase the size of their 
herds beyond the size they would have maintained if they had to confine 
and feed the animals on their own property. Conversely, landowners in 
such a situation would tend to underinvest in improvements other than 
fences, lawyers' fees, and buckshot. 17 Where there is plenty of forest or 
scrub land, free grazing may damage society less than the cost of enclosing 
the animals. But as the supply of forests, nuts, and grasses decreases, more 
and more fanners-renters and sharecroppers, as well as landowners-will 
suffer losses from roaming animals; and future generations will be robbed 
to allow for the rapid exploitation of resources in the present. 
Since every fanner under an open-range regime has an economic incen-
. tive to transfer his own cost of raising livestock onto others, private 
contracts in this setting are difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate and 
enforce when there are many fanners. Such a situation inevitably creates a 
demand for government intervention; but because the strength of the 
competing groups varies, the government's ultimate decision is likely to be 
influenced by the power of each individual group." The ftnal allocation of 
property rights dictated by the government, therefore, may not confonn to 
the one that maximizes "social welfare" and offers no guarantee that the 
outcome would be equitable to any person or group. 
According to Lance E. Davis and Douglass C. North, people will seek a 
change in the institutional status quo when the net present value of a new 
regime of property rights exceeds the net present value of the traditional set 
of rights. 19 As the costs and benefits are continuously changing under each 
17 S1ock-law admcal<s often chargrd that I he slalus quo kd lo loo many law•niu. Sec. 
e.g., Canolhon (Ga.) Carroll County TimtJ, january 10, 1873; Carrolhon (Ga.) Carroll Frtt 
Pms, Ma)' 8 ami June 5. 1885;Jcrfcrson (Ga.)joc!son lftrold, Apri115, 1881, Augu51 24. 
1883, ami Angus! 2. 1885. 
10 Sec for example Geo rge J. Sligler. "The Theory of Economic Rcgnlalion," Btll 
Joomwl of Economi<J and Manngtmtnt Sritnct, II (Spring 1971), 3-21 ; Sam l'dtzm;m. 
"Toward a Mor~ Ccnrral Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economi<l, XIX 
(August l!l7fi), 211- ·18; an<l Gary S. llcckcr. • A llocory of Compctilion Among l'rc••urc 
Cmnp• for l'oliliral lnnurnce," Quartrrl_y Jownnl of Economi<J, XCVJII (Augusl 1!183). 
371- ·100. 
19 l.an<~ F.. Davi• ami Douglass C. Non h. /nslilutionnl Chnngt and Amtrican Eronomic 
Cro11•lh (Camhridg~. Eng .. 1!171). 3-79. Sec al•o llarold Dcnucll, "Toward a Them)' of 
Propel'!)' RiKIII•." .1mrrirnn Economic Rto•itw. LVII. No. 2: PnfJrr> and Prorrtdiugs of lht 
Swmty-uiurh :luuual Mrtliug oftht ilmrrimn f:ronomic !IJJoriation (Mar 1967). 3-17- 59. For 
an o\·enic'A· of rc~ca• rh i.n ("C"ono mic history on rclatr:d queslions of rhe polilical t-conomy 
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institutional structure, the net present value calculation will become a 
dynamic process that individuals and groups constantly update. Examples 
of changes that might have encouraged groups in upcountry Georgia to 
reassess the costs and benefits of keeping the fence law include technologi-
cal advances in agriculture and animal husbandry, improved transportation, 
changes in population density, increases in cultivated acreage, and changes 
in the relative prices of certain commodities, such as timber, labor, animals, 
animal products, and agricultural produce. 
While the inhabitants of the nineteenth-century Georgia upcountry were 
unaware of neoclassical economic theory, many of their argwnents in the 
fence-law debate resemble those of modem economists. Like recent theo-
rists of property rights and institutional change, nineteenth-century Georgians 
discussed prospective gains in farming efficiency and resource conserva-
tion. There was widespread agreement that the decision turned on the 
availability of timber for fenceS, the density of population, and the degrees 
of concentration on growing crops and raising stock. Since, unlike econo-
mists, the practical disputants were seeking to form majority coalitions in 
referenda, there was also considerable discussion of who might be expected 
to gain or lose if the institutional structure changed. By far the most 
common abstract or ideological appeal during the debate stressed the 
inconsistency of the fence law with private property rights-an indication 
that stock-law proponents believed that the citizens of the upcountry shared 
a belief in the moral correctness of private property rights. By contrast, 
invocations of traditional rights, which Hahn equates with "preindustrial 
republicanism," were a quite minor part of extant records of the debate over 
fence laws in Carroll and Jackson Counties; even those who refetted to 
such rights treated them as exceptional and temporary constraints on a more 
general system of private property.211 Rather than an ideological conflict 
over abstract principles, the debate was largely a hard-headed clash of 
interests waged by pragmatic agriculturalists. "We know," said stock-law 
supporterS. B. Orr of Carroll County, "that people will vote for what they 
suppose to be personal interest in this matter. "21 
Georgia law from colonial times until after the Civil War essentially 
of institutions, ace: Gary D. Libecap, "Property Righls in Economic Hislory: lmplicaliona 
for Research." Ezplorolioru i11 Eco11o•i€ Hulo.,, XXIII (July 1986), 227-52. 
10 Hahn, Rooll of SouiA•m Populu• . 253. In an examinalion of much more: recent 
conflicll over fence: laws in Shasta Counay, California, Robert C. Ellickson emphasizes that 
mosl were ac:ulc:d by "norma of neighborliness," rather than by r"sorling lo lhc law. In 
difficult caac:a, he: notes, thc:ac informal m"lhods included rhetorical backbiting and 
thrcalc:nc:d or aclual violc:nc" againSI inlruding animals. Nc:vcnhdcss, his inlc:rvic:wa 
ahow"d an almost univc:nal belief thai "an own"r of livc:slock is r"sponsibl., for the acls 
of his animals. • In other word a, 1hc:y believed in whal Hahn IUms "absolule private: 
propc:ny. · ·sec Ellickson, "OfCoase and Caule: Oispule R.,solution Among Nc:ighhora in 
Shasta Coumy," Stanford Low Rrouw, XXXVIII (february 1986), 623-87 (quolations in 
foolnolc: 20 arc on p. 673). 
11 Carrollton Carroll Fr11 Prm, May 22, 1885. 
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held that unfenced land could be used as common pasture.22 This was not an 
English or "Celtic" inheritance, for in the densely populated British Isles, 
common law did not force property owners to fence in their crops. 23 Rather, 
owners of animals were required to keep their stock on their own property, 
and stray animals on a neighbor's enclosed or unenclosed land were 
considered trespassers. Vast unimproved land and sparse settlements in 
America, however, made it economical to allow animals to roam the 
counttyside freely. Eventually, landowners were compelled either to erect 
and maintain "lawful" fences or to forgo legal claims to compensation for 
damages caused by another person's animaJs.2A Georgia's f1rst fence law, 
passed in 1759, explicitly required that: 
All fences or enclosures that shall be made around or about any garden, 
orchard, rice ground, indigo field, plantation or settlement in this province, 
shall be six feet high from the ground when staked or ridered and from the 
ground to the height of three feet of every such fence or enclosure, the rails 
thereof shall not be more than four inches distant from each other; and that all 
fences or enclosures that shall consist of paling shall likewise be six feet from 
the ground and the pales thereof not more than two inches asunder: Provided 
always, that where any fence or enclosure shall be made with a ditch or trench, 
the same shall be four feet wide, and in that case the fence shall be5ix feet high 
from the bottom of the ditch.zs 
Those whose fences did not adhere precisely to the fence law were subject 
to treble damages if they killed or injured a stray animal on inadequately 
fenced land.26 In the 1881 decisioo of Hamilton v. Howard, the Georgia 
Supreme Court declared that a lawful fence had to rise five feet from the 
n Even under the fence-law regime, •common rights" were not unlimited. Although 
people were free to allow their animalato roam the countryaidc, they did not, accordin11 
to the Georaia Supreme Court, have a lawful "common tide" to uncncloacd land. In 
Wnghl H. HorTillv. HannuM ond CollMan (56 Ga. 508 ( 1876J),the court ruled that a callle 
farmer did not have a riahtto paaturc in the wooda or upon the unenclosed land of others. 
The caulc farmer, aaid the court, "doca not act forth any contract, preouiption or other 
lawful basia for the riaht he claima. What belongs to the world at larae !. no man'a in 
parlicular .•• . • 
11 For the allcaed contrast between Enalish and "Celtic" fcncina practices, aee Grady 
McWI-;'ley and Forreat McDonald, "Celtic Origina of Southern llerdin1 Practiceo," 
Joumo! ofSouth•m llistory, Ll (May 1985), 165-82. For a masterful critique, ace Rowland 
Berth<. If, "Celtic Miot Over the South," ibid., Lll (November 1986), 525-46. 
1
• Waahburn and Moen Manufacturina Co., Th• f•ncr Qtudion in tA•SowA•m StaiiJ tu 
Rtlot1d lo Gtnnalllwkndry and SA11p Raising, with tA11listory of frnc• CwloJJU, and l.owJ 
P~rtaining TAm to: And a Vi..., of IAI NIUI Fam SJJtiJO of I At So utA, IU Shown in tAt Crruw of 
1880 (Worcester; Maaa., 1881), 10-11 . For a discuasion of the devdopment of the open· 
ranac syatem in New England, ace William Cronan, ChongrJ in th• Land: lndiaru, Co/onutJ, 
and Ill• EcoloiJ of N"" Englond (New York, 1983), Chap. 7. 
n Uahn, Roots of Southtm Populu ... , 60-61 . In the urly nineteenth century, however, 
the Gcoraia General Assembly did reduce the leaal height of fences by a foot . Ibid. 
" It ia unclear how widespread "lawful" fences were, for ccnsua figures do not 
distinauiah between lawful and ohort or rickety fence•. One Georgia obtcrver dcdarcd 
that ·a lawful fence io of rare occurrence in the older countiea. • See C. W. llowanl in 
Carrollton Carroll Coun11 Tim11, January 10, 1873. 
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ground everywhere, rather than merely averaging that heightY Further-
more, an 1889 decision ruled that an agreement to dispense with a partition 
fence (one between two neighbors) was not the equivalent of a legal fence. 
Unless an actual fence-not merely a contract or agreement to dispense 
with a fence or an agreement to treat a dividing line as a fence-were 
broken, it was illegal for a farmer to harm a stray.21 The court's message 
throughout was clear: a legal fence was defined absolutely with no room for 
variations. 
In the post-Civil War era, as population expanded throughout the South, 
as blacks took advantage of their freedom to move, and as the growth of the 
railroad network facilitated marketing crops from previously isolated areas, 
population density increased in the Georgia upcountry. Carroll County's 
population growth was especially rapid: the black population surged 77 
percent during the 1870s and 67 percent during the 1880s; the white 
population also increased relatively quickly, with a total gain of76 percent 
over the two decades. Jackson County's black population multiplied at a 
more modest rate, with an 1870 to 1890 total of 45 percent, but the white 
sector shot up 84 percent over the two decades. Overall, Carroll County's 
population grew by 89 percent from 1870 to 1890; and Jackson's, by 72 
percent.29 
To stock-law supporters, the increasing pressure on the land required 
that it be used more efticiently.30 Almost all nineteenth-century southern 
farmers used "worm" fences to enclose their crops and fences made of 
pales for their gardens and homesteads. Because worm fences were con-
structed by laying the ends of rails on top of each other, zigzag fashion, a 
three-and-a-half to four-foot strip of land on each side of the fence was 
wasted.31 For every mile of fence, approximately one acre of productive 
land was squandered. Writing from the adjacent county of Coweta, which 
had already adopted the stock law, 1. P. Reese (alias "Ripples") contended 
that "the old fence rows of Carroll county will make com enough in three 
years to pay for all the crops that will grow in the county for the next ten 
years."32 Other savings could be made because improving small patches of 
fertile land would be profitable if they did not have to be protected by 
" II a milton v. lfowanJ, 68 Ga. 288 ( 1881 ). 
11 Tumlin v. p.,,.oll, 82 Ga. 732 ( 1889). 
"A pouible undercount or the Carroll County black population in 1870 does not 
d<"tracl from thes<' trends . tr 1860, rather than 1870, is used as the base year, the growth 
rateS of the total population in the tWO COUnties Wf're 86 percent and 81 percf'nt, 
respectively. 
"There was only a small movement to enact stock laws in the comparatively sparsely 
settled antebellum South. See King, "Closing of th~ Soulh~rn Range," 55-56. 
"Carrollton CIJI'Tall Fret Prm, May 22, 1885; and Washburn and Moen, Ftnct QtUslion, 
16. "Subscriber," in Southma Cultivato,, XXXVI (January 1878), 7, gave the total width or 
th~ slrip as betw~~n six and seven, rather I han eight, feet. 
"Carrollton Carroll Fret Prm, April 17, 1885. In the heat of argum~nt, "Ripples" 
unqu~stionably exagg~rated. 
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fences. 33 Jackson County's Eugene F. Adair predicted that "if there was a 
law compelling owners of stock to keep them Wlder a fence, we could clear 
and plant just such pieces of land as we thought best. Leaving out the 
poorest, we could plant where we pleased, no matter how small, or in what 
shape it might be. ":W Defenders of the fence law derided the claimed 
savings in land as exaggerated, but they denied neither the general point nor 
its importance. 3' 
The consensus among both stock-law and fence-law supporters that the 
choice between the two laws depended on the demographic, ecological, 
and economic conditions of the locale demonsttates that this was not 
primarily a cultural controversy. As T. D. Henderson, the state agriculture 
corrunissioner, noted, "It is not expected that the stock law will be adopted 
in the wire-grass counties of the state, where the larger area is in pasture." In 
most of the counties of north Georgia, however, "the adoption of the stock 
law is only a question oftime," he believed.36 Likewise, at the 1878 meeting 
of the Georgia State Agricultural Society, a stock-law opponent from Clay 
CoWtty conceded, "In Middle and Upper Georgia, I have no doubt it [the 
stock law) would operate well; but it would not do in Southern Georgia. No 
further south than Decatur county there are thousands of acres good for 
stock, and unless the stock run at large these lands do no good. "37 In an 1883 
editorial, the Jefferson (Ga.) Jackson Herald declared, "It stands to reason, 
that in an agricultural country stock is not of such great importance as the 
"Since the area of a square piece orland increases by the square of each side, and that 
of other shapes grows by sin1ilar amounts, owners of small plou had to split proportion-
ately many more rails than owners of larger farms, if, indeed, either fenced in his land. 
A simple example shows the consequences in wasted land. Suppose a piece of land were 
square and 100 feet on each side. Then the total area would be 100 X 100 = 10,000 oquare 
feet. The amount occupied by a worm fence would be 100 X 7 X 4 = 2,800 square feet (i.e., 
length times width times number of sides). (We used the sm>ller estimate of width to 
minimize the figure for w:osted land.) But at each corner, thc fences would overlap, so we 
must eliminate 7 X 7 X 4 = 196 square feet (width times width times number of corners). 
So the fence would take up2,604 square feet, or 26 percent, of the land. If the square were 
1,000 feet long, a similar calculation shows that .the percentage occupied by the fence 
would amount to only about 2.8 percent oft he larger field . (If all fenceo were on the edges 
of every farmer's land, so that only half of the widd1 of each fence would have to he 
subtracted from the land of each farmer, the calculations would lead to analogous 
percentages of 13.5 and 1.4.) This admittedly extreme example demonstrates two 
principles: first, it could ~ relatively waoteful to fence small fertile portions of fidds; 
second, where fences were maintained, the burden of the fence law fell disproportionally 
on small, not large, farmers. 
"Jefferson (Ca.) Foml New•. December 24, 1880. Thejarbon Herald was the succusor 
to this newspaper. 
" "Subscriber." in Soulhtm Cultivator, XXXVI Oanuary 1878), 7-8. 
"llenderson quoted in Carrollton Carroll County Timn, August4, 1882. For a <I~ tailed 
calculation of th<' discounted net present nlue of the expected prolitahility of a chang< 
to the stoclr.law in the six standard regions of Georgia in 1880, which strongly supports 
Henderson's statement, sec Shawn Ev<'rett Kantor, "Razorbacks, Ticky Cows. and the 
Closing of th~ Georgia Open Range: The Dynamics of lnMitutional Change Uncovered," 
journal of Economic Hutory, Ll (December 1991 ), 866-70 . 
.., Procttding> of the Ctorgia StaU Agricultural S«kty, /876to /878(Atlanta, 1878), 415-16. 
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crops, hence they should be confined. If this was a stock country the crops, 
which would be small and insignificant, ought to be fenced. "31 Although he 
disagreed with the newspaper about which arrangement was to be pre-
ferred, a fence-law advocate from the Fair Play district of Jackson County 
accepted the notion that the decision on whether to adopt the stock law 
depended on "denseness or sparseness of population, the geographical 
situation, irrigation .... "39 
On this issue, each side's proponents in Carroll and Jackson Counties 
clashed less on principles than on facts. Thus, "School Boy" of Carroll 
County admitted that "when our fathers fust settled this connty [sic] and 
our range was good and when the acreage in cultivation was [s]mall, the 
present system of fencing was proper, but now we have no range, cows are 
hungry and often in our or our neighbors fields, the acreage of cleared land 
is more than that for pastures."40 A week later, "Con," a fence-law sup-
porter, asserted that "There is at least three-fourths of our land in the range 
or conunons .... "4t Longtime Carroll County resident and stock-law sup-
ported. 0 . R. Word reflected on earlier days: "Forty nine years ag[ o] father 
moved to [t]his county. It was then a fme range for stock. l[t] was then the 
best economy to fence up our crops, for our farms were small and far 
between and range fresh and large.'042 1n Jackson County in 1876 John G. 
Justice, a prominent Democrat whose farm was worth three-and-a-half 
times the value of the average farm in Jackson County, contended that the 
county was not yet suitable for the stock law, which was "only adapted to 
those countries so densely populated as to afford no pasturage outside the 
enclosed lands .... "4l Ten years later, "J. B." of the same county came to 
quite a different conclusion: "There is absolutely nothing outside [the 
fenced areas] for the stock to graze on-no range worth anything .... "44 
"Ripples" stated it more succinctly: "This is not a range country like it once 
was."•s 
Though more rhetorical, other statements by fence-law champions also 
accepted the conunon pool argument. White Republican and stock raiser 
William D. Lovvorn of Carroll County saw no reason for the stock law 
because "the woods are full of grass and acorns part of the year. They were 
u Jeffenonjocbon Hmald,July 20, 188!1. 
"/bid., june 17, 1881. 
40 Carrollton C4rToll Coun11 TiiiW, September 1, 1882. 
"Ibid., September 8, 1882. 
tt Carrollton Carroll Frr1 Prm, May 1, 188!i. 
tt Jeffenon Forrsl NftJJJ, September 16, 1876 . 
.. Jcfferaonjocbon Htrold, March !i, 1886. 
tt Newnan (Ga.) Htrald,Junc 30, 1881. For otherexamplea of agreement by both a idea 
on the criteria of "denaeneu or aparaencaa of population, the geographical aituation, 
irrigation." and other factora, aee, t.g., Jcffcnon Fortsl NnJJ•, September 19, 1879; 
Jefferaonfacbon H~rold,June 17, 1881; and Carrollton Carroll Frtt Pr ... , Aprill7 and May 
I, 1885. Both Carroll andjackaon Countlea were below the alate average in the number 
of milch cowa, other cattle, ahecp, and awine, and the overall value of liveatock in 1880, 
and above the atale average in the proportion of improved acro:age to total farm acreage. 
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put here by our Creator for benefit to his people, and I don't think it right to 
deprive a large majority to please a minority."46 J. W. Pitts expanded 
Lovvorn's analysis: "We have acorns, hickory-nuts, chestnuts and m[o]ss 
for hogs and in most parts we have a splendid range of grass. Wouldn't it be 
foolishness to shut our stock from it? Of course it would." Although Pitts 
believed that Cattoll's natural resources were large enough to make the 
stock law unnecessary, he did not categorically dismiss the idea that fences 
would one day be necessary: "While they [trees) are all cut down and 
washed away in a great many places, Carroll boasts of plenty of timber, one 
thousand acres or more in one body, while the fields are small.lt 's the other 
way in those counties [that have adopted the stock law], and when Carroll 
gets in that condition we'll give up for no fence, and not before."47 
Refonners in Jackson and Carroll Counties claimed that the stock law 
would save farmers both labor and capital. "It takes away most of the profit 
of fanning to keep up good fences," announced I. H. P. Beck, a landless 
fanner, schoolteacher, and later local leader in the Farmers' Alliance and 
the Populist and Republican parties.•• "P." of Thompson's Mills, Jackson 
County, estimated that "it takes one-tenth of the time spent on the farm to 
repair fences. Could not we spend it more profitably? Could we not use that 
time in making compost heaps?"49 "Plow Boy" suggested that "we should 
dispense with fences ... because we could spend our time at something 
that would be much more remunerative than patching up fences such as 
making our manure heaps larger, stopping washes, etc., besides we would 
have no other stock to see after but our own."" Likewise, Eugene Adair 
asserted that "while we used to split and haul rails, we could, under this 
arrangement [the stock law], with the same labor, be making manure to 
improve the land intended to be cultivated."51 Farmers cared more about 
compost heaps than capitalism. 
" Carrollton C.ITOII Fr" l'rm, June 5, 188!1. For l.ovvorn'a lonallme Republican 
activiam, ace ibid., March 1!1, 189!1. Accordinato the 1880 cenaua manuacripta, the value 
ofLovvorn'alivealock waa higher than that of any other participant in the fence-law debate 
in the two count lea who could be traced to the cenaua. Philo H. Chandler, who awitched 
aides durinsthe 1880a and became a atock·law aupporter, valued hia livea1ock at the aamc 
amoum aa Lovvorn did. Lovvorn owned acvcnty·fivc acrea of foreat land and fifty·nine 
tilled acrca, and his livestock wu worth nearly four times 1ha1 of the averaae owner· 
operated Carroll County farm. 
'' Carrollton Con'oll Coun17 Ti•t~, Auguat 2!1 and September 8, 1882. 
41 Carrollton C.n'oll Fr11 Prtu, May 1!1, 188!1. For Beck's Alliance, Populist, and 
Republican activity, ace ibid., February 28, 1890, April I !I, May 6 and july 8, 1892. and 
March 1!1, 189!1. 
'' jcffenonjcacuon llnald, August 3, 1883. 
"Carrollton Carroll Fr11 Prm, Aprill7, 188!1. 
11 jefferson Forlll Nn»J, December 24, 1880. Similarly, ace Proutdinp of lA• Gtorgia 
Stcall llgri<ullurcal SociiiJ, IB76 lo 1878, pp. 412, and 419-22; Hn11 and Fcarwt, quolcd in 
Jefferson Foml Ntv~J, April 23, 1880; Anson (N.C.) Ti•ll, quoted in Jeffenon Jorl>on 
HnaiJ., April 15, 1881; Carrollton Ccan'oll Frr1 Prtu, May 22, 188!1; Soullltm Cullilllllor, 
XXXV (Auaull 1877), 299-300; and Sou/Atm CulliiiCIIorand Di"i' Fcan111r, XL (December 
1882), 17, and XLI Oune 1883), 2. 
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Other stock -law advocates tried to make more precise calculations of the 
economic disadvantages of the status quo. "lbe whole subject," the Jefferson 
Jackson Herald ann01mced, "is one that can be reduced to dollars and 
cents. "52 For instance, "School Boy" claimed that "the fences of Carroll 
county are worth three times more than all the hogs, cows and sheep in the 
county, and I ... ask ... if it is economy for a man to have one dollar 
invested in a business and it takes three t[o] keep that one dollar up."53 A 
correspondent from Villa Rica in CaiT'OII County contended that "the land 
taken up by the fence around a man's farm will produce more than the value 
of the stock fenced out."54 After diligent computation, "Vande Linctum" 
found that "for every dollar invested in livestock in the State, two dollars 
are required for the construction of fences to protect the growing crops."'' 
"Hopeful" from Human's Store, Jackson County, "found out that it costs us 
twice as much to fence out stock as it does to pay our taxes, and besides we 
have had about enough of our crops destroyed by stock to pay our 
taxes . ... "56 Adair of Jackson County computed an initial cost of$210 for 
the materials and labor needed to fence one hundred acres." One of the few 
stock-law opponents to counter this argwnent, Abner Nixon, who tilled 
nearly twice as many acres as the average owner-operator in Carroll 
County and whose farm was worth nearly twice the county average, 
admitted that fencing stock would save timber but preferred, instead, more 
intensive fanning: "I think a better way would be for us to turn out more 
than half our land we have under old broke down fences and put good 
fences around as much land 8.s we can put in a proper state [of] cultivation. 
It would certainly be much better to raise 40 bushels of com per acre on 8 
acres of [land] than 8 bushels per acre on 40 acres of land."B Both stock-
law advocates and opponents showed the calculating state of mind 
"Jdfenonjackson 1/rra/d,June 20, 1883. 
"Carroll! on Carroll County Timts, September I, 1882. 
,. Carrolhon Carroll Fru Prtss, May I, 1885. 
"Jcffersonjatkson /lrrald,June 17, 1881. 
,. Jefferson Fomt Nro~s, September 5, 1879. 
"Ibid., December 24, 1880. Similarly, see Soulhtm Cultioolor, XXXIV (May I876), I 78-
79, (june 1876), 220, XXXV (Augustl877), 299- 300, and XXXIX (january 1881 ), I5- I6; 
Carrollton Carroll County Timts , August 4, 1882; and Newnan lltrald,July 28, 1881. 
"Carrollton Carroll Fr11 Pms,June 26, 1885. For a similar argument from a legal (not 
a mo ral) angle, see "Noxin Renba" (Abner Nixon spelled backwards) ibid., May 8, 1885. 
In the June 26 leuer, Nhwn also responded to the contention that the depredations of 
wandering stock unfairly reduced the value of farmers' land by arguing that the price of 
land had always taken into account the fact that stock could run free: "The citizens of this 
county have and always have had tl.- legal, mo ral, and the Bible right to let their stock, 
unl•ss of a dangerous character, run at large . Wf: all know (•ic(this when we purchased 
our lands.- Since he embedded his ref .renee to "Bihle o·ight" in a rather sophisticalcd 
classical economir .a•·gument, the rdigious phrase should no t be interpn:ted, a!. Hahn, in 
Roots of Soulhtm Populism, 252, does, as evidence o f adherence to "a vision of the 
cooperath·e commonwealth." Both sides, of course, could and did claim biblical•uthority. 
Stock-law supporters in a debate at Lid.skillit, Georgia , contended that "the law is a legal 
law and ran be establi•hed by the scriptures as just and right. • Carrollton Carroll Frtt PrtJJ, 
June 5, 1885. lf "B.'s" stock destroyed • A.'s" crops, remarked a Sparta, Georgia, farmer, 
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characteristic of capitalism, and neither side rejected the market. 
Even more often than they stressed saving labor and capital, refonners 
prophesied that the stock law would improve the quality of livestock and, 
thus, yield better meat and dairy products." While fencing in stock might 
reduce the quantity of livestock. the improved quality of the animals would 
more than compensate for the loss in nwnber. The argwnent by "Ripples" 
was typical: 
The milk and butter is free from poisons taken from cows that are kept up [i.t., 
fenced in) and then you know what your cattle eat. But when they woods it, you 
don't know when you are drinking or eating deadly poisons. Butter made from 
cows kept up is much richer than from those cows that are allowed to run at 
large. There is as much difference as between gold and nickle silver. The beef 
is fatter, tenderer and better. Breed stock can be improved. One good cow well 
fed and pastured Is worth S tlcky woods cows. Two hogs kept up is worth ten 
razor backs running at large. 
Others asserted that Coweta CoWtty, which passed the stock law in 1881, 
was self-sufficient in meat while Canoll was not. "Here are two coWlties, 
one self sustaining and the other not," "Plow Boy" wrote in 1885 in the 
Carrollton (Oa.) Carroll Free Press, "and yet some will tell you that you 
cant raise hogs in a stock law county." "Ripples,~ who lived in Coweta but 
often wrote for the Carroll CoWlty newspapers, admitted that "we don't 
have quite so many hogs over here in Coweta as we used to have" before 
Coweta passed a stock law, but he assured residents of Carroll CoWtty that 
Coweta hogs "are a heap bigger and fatter. "60 The response by "L. F. L.," 
that "Grandpa and grandma milked ticky cows and they lived a heap better 
than we do," was ahnost self-mocking.61 
Unlike their grandparents, upcoWltry residents of the late nineteenth 
centwy increasingly enjoyed easy access to national and international 
markets. What James C. Bormer concluded about Canoll County charac-
terized the whole upcountry: "The railroads did more to quicken the 
economic tempo of Canoll CoWlty than any other event during [the 
nineteenth] century. "62 Railroads reached Carrollton, Carroll County's seat, 
"it is clear that as B."o prop•rty caused the damage, h• ought to be the loser. The Bible 
sustains this idea, as in the case of A.'s ox killing B.'s ox." Soulhrm Cullivolor XXXVI 
(December 1878), 451. Private property, according to a North Carolina pap"r quoted 
ibid., XXXIX Qanuary 1881 ), 15-16, "is founded upon corr.,ct moral principles, laid down 
in the first legal work ev"r given to man, the code, by that great law giver, Mos.,o." 
"For evid~nct: of the correclneiJ of rhcir prophecies, 1ec Kantor. •the Causes and 
Consequences of Southern Enclosure, 1850·1890" (unpub. paper, Univ•rsity of Arizona, 
1991). 
00 Carrolhon Carroll Frtt Prm. April 17 (first and ••cond quotations), May I (thin! 
quotation), 1885. Similarly, see Carrollton Can·o/1 C•unty Tinw.January 10. 1873, and 
Sept.,mber 8 , 1882; Anson Timu, quoted injdfersonjaduon lltrald, April 15, 1881 ; 
Jeffersonjaclson lltrald, August 24. 1883, October 31, 1884, March 20 and August 2. 
1885; and Carrollton Carroll Frtt Prm.June 19, 1885. 
"Carrollton Carroll Fm Prtu, April 24 , 1883. 
"Bonner, Gtorgia'J f..OJI Fronlitr, 99. G•orgia railroad miles increas•d from 1.518 in 
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in 1874; Villa Rica, the COWlty's second largest town, in 1882; and Jefferson, 
the Jackson County seat, in 1884. Not only did the railroad allow fanners 
and stock raisers to market their products more cheaply and efficiently, it 
also helped to increase production itself by enabling upcountJy fanners to 
import large amounts of commercial fertilizer. 63 Increased productivity and 
profitability in tum stimulated the land market, which raised the stakes of 
the fence-law controversy. 
Like railroad promoters, fence-law reformers focused on future eco-
nomic gains. In a Darwinian allusion, "Edgar" declared that "we must 
learn to give way to the fittest, for by so doing we will keep prospering, and 
if not, we will never prosper.tt64 Even more certain of the stock law's 
necessity, Jackson County's "P." stated, "I regard it [the stock law] as the 
preliminary step to the prosperity of the agriculturalists of JacksQn county."" 
On the eve of the first fence election in Carroll County, "Ripples" chided 
his opponents: "Dont say the time is not yet come to begin to economize. "66 
Opponents were guilty of "old fogyism, general ignorance and backward-
ness" for favoring a system in force "in no civilized portion of the world. "'7 
"Economy is what the Southern fanner has not learned yet. "61 Stock-law 
champions would teach him. 
While advocates of the new regime stressed progress, their opponents 
just as superficially invoked tradition. Thus, Jackson County's "Fair Play" 
forthrightly sought to preserve the status quo: "Our present system of 
fencing is an old one-so old that it would seem cruel to attempt an 
innovation upon it.- Another saw the fence law as an embodiment of "the 
liberty that our forefathers fought for."10 "0. W. C." of Carroll County 
expressed a different attitude toward risk than his stock-law neighbors: "He 
[1. H. P. Beck] says that he would rather jwnp into something new than to 
stand still and die in stagnation. There's where we differ, I would rather 
stagnate than to die in the stock law." Such statements made easy targets for 
New South metoric: "'By long usage our people are accustomed to the 
wagons, and why should we now try to supplant them by an engine? 
1867 to 2,4591n 1880 (a 59 percent incrcuc) and to 4,600.8 in 1890 (a further 87 percent 
incrcaoe). Sec H. V. and H. W. Poor, Ptu~r~ Manual of RailroadJ of Ill• Unil1d SlaltJ (New 
York, 186&.1924), 1880 Vol., p. v,1888 Vol., p.uv, and 1895 Vol., p. xxxvi. The beat brief 
introduction to the development of the poalbellum upcountry economy in Georgia also 
emphasize• the Importance of lhc railroad. Sec David F. Weiman, "The Economk 
Emancipation of the Non.Siaveholding Cl:ua: Upcoumry Farmen in the Georgia Cotton 
Economy; Journal of Eeon-ic HiJiory XLV (March 1985), 71-93. 
u Sec Hahn, Roots of South1m PO/iulir•. 145-52; and Weiman, "Economic Emanci-
pation.• 
14 Carrollton Carroll Coun" Ti111J, September I, 1882. 
u JcffenonJacbon Htrald, Auguat3, 1883. 
"Carrollton Carroll Count' Ti.,IJ, September 8, 1882. 
" HoJttl and Fa,.., quoted in jeffenon ForrJI Nn.JJ, April 23, 1880. 
"Carrollton Carroll Counl' Ti'""· May 3, 1878. 
"jcffenonJaelJon H""ld,junc 17, 1881. 
"Quoted in Flynn, Whill Land, BIMA Lahor, 131. 
COMMON SENSE OR COMMONWEALTH? 215 
Whew! Supreme folly! • The fence law as we now have it was itself, at one 
age of the world, a new thing." Or, as another refonner jeered: "Does 
improvement, progress and enterprise mean cruelty? Then Webster stands 
revised. "71 . 
What the stock-law advocates wished to conserve was not the rhetorical 
ideals opportunistically employed by both sides in the controversy, but 
tangible resow-ces. They thought that unchecked exploitation of forests to 
build extensive networks of fences robbed futw-e generations and threat-
ened to denude the areas of timber. As J. 0. R. Word insisted, "this is a 
question of vast importance not only to the present, but to the future 
generation," and a few weeks later he declared, "I speak in behalf of saving 
the timber for the benefit of the future generation .... ""Vande Linctwn" 
claimed that "the repair of fences annually calls for the destruction of nt'.arly 
100,000 acres of timber, which, when taken in connection with other 
depletions of forest in the next half century, will leave the entire country 
destitute of timber." Moreover, since milroads not only used wood for ties 
but also made it possible to sell timber in a larger marketplace, the 
expansion of the rail network made lumber more valuable than it b.ul been 
when the upcountry was isolated and self-sufficient. As "Ripples" re-
marked, "If I owned the timber of Carroll county I would not· want any 
bigger fortune. The way to save your timber is adopt the stock law."12 
Although the Georgia General Assembly of 1 879 allowed barbed wire to 
be classed as a legal fence for the purpose of keeping out larger draft 
animals, the wire was relatively expensive, and refonners believed, no 
doubt correctly, that upcountry fanners wpuld continue to build more 
wooden fences for some time.13 
To concrete arguments for efficiency, prosperity, and conservation, 
stock-law advocateS sometimes added more philosophical appeals. The 
concept of private property, proponents of the stock law repeated endlessly, 
was incompatible with the open range. Apparently realizing the potency of 
an appeal to private property, opponents of the stock law rarely responded, 
as they presumably would have if they had believed that there was a 
consensus on conununitarian values.· "What belongs to me I have a perfect 
right to do as I please with it, what does not, I have no right to at all," 
71 C: rrollton Ctarroll Fr" Pr1u, June 19, 188!1 (lin1 quo1a1ion); andjeff~nonJecLon 
Htreld, Jun~ 24, 1881 (a~cond and third quota1iona). 
"Carrollton Ctarro/1 Frtl Prm, May I and june 12, 1885 O· 0. R. Word quotationa); 
J~ffenonJecLon Htreltl, Jun~ 17, 1881 (Vande Unctum quotation); and Carrolhon 
Cerroll Co,.nly Tim11, September 8, 1882 (Ripplea quotation). In the Middl~ Weu, the 
conflict over fence lawa began in the 1840sand 1850s because ofthearea'asmaller 1imbr-r 
resourcea, according 10 Hayter, "livestock·Fencing Conflic1s," 13. 
,. Ce. Acl! . .. J8i8-i9, No. 304, p. 165. The apccifications of 1he legal barbed wi1c 
fenc~a were revised in Ca. Acl! . .. 1882-BJ, No. 440, p. 139. It waa not only the relath·e 
coat of barbed wire that bother~d farmers but also that the wire was though• to injun· 
animala who ran against it. For ~vidence that farmera were cautious about adopting wire 
f~nc~a. ae~ Southtrn Cultivator, XXXIX (October 1881), 376 and (Dec~mber 181!1),1H. 
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remarked S. B. Orr of Carroll CoWJty.74 "I am compelled to build a lawful 
fence: or in other words a fence, 'horse-high, bull-strong and pig-tight,' to 
protect my own growing crop," said "P." of Thompson's Mills, Jackson 
County. "Is that just? If this land belongs to me, has your stock any right to 
anything that grows upon it without my consent? That is my property. As a 
matter of justice, as a matter of policy, what right have you to the grasses 
that grow on the land of your neighbor? It is only a permissive right, there is 
no legal or moral right in it. "n "Where does one man have a right to let his 
stock nm over, and feed upon another's land?'' asked "L.," a landless 
citiun of Carroll CoWJty in 1878.76 Future Populist district conunitteeman 
I. H. P. Beck proclaimed," A man's land is his own and one man's cow has 
no right to nm on another's land inclosed [sic] or not."n 
Drawing on familiar Jeffersonian rhetoric, reformers attacked fence 
laws as incompatible with republican independence. As "L." advised, "If 
you have stock. own a piece of land to put tJ:lem on, and keep them; not have 
them, and allow them to nm over other's property."71 Not only did stock-
law advocates claim that roving stock illegally violated their personal 
property rights, they also believed that their neighbors had a moral obliga-
tion to respect these rights. Appealing to the individualistic tradition of 
natwal rights, J. 0. R. Word proclaimed that "from a sense of justice 
between man and man, I think that every man should be compelled to take 
care of his own stock. that he has no moral right to tum loose his stock to 
prowl around upon his neighbor's ctop."79 Illustrating the incongruity of 
common grazing rights within a more general system of private property, 
proponents of the stock law posed homespWl analogies: "A man has as 
much rig~t to take his household and kitchen furniture and put it in another 
man's house and kitchen, as he does for his stock to nm on his neighbor's 
enclosed or Wlenclosed [land). "10 A Carrollton Carroll Free Press reporter 
from Villa Rica described the logical implication of a law that allowed an 
individual's stock to grau upon a neighbor's land: "If he has this right, then 
by the same reasoning, he would be entitled to all the property not sheltered. 
A buggy or wagon left from WJder the shelter would be public property. "11 
"Carrollton Co,-oll Frtt PrtJJ, May I. 1885. 
"Jdfersonjac.Uon lftrald, August 3, 1883. 
"Carrollton Ca,-oll County r;,.,.,June 7, 1878. 
"Carrollton Co,-oll Fru Prm, May 15, 1885. Similarly, see Southtm Cultivator, XXXIV 
<June 1876). 220, {Decomber 1876). 461. XXXVI {December 1878). 451. XXXIX <January 
1881), 15-16, XL {December 1882), 17; Procttdings oftht Gtorgia Stolt Agricultural Socitly, 
1876 to 1878, pp. 412.415, and 419-22; /lomr and Farm, quoted in jefferson Fomt Nrws, 
Apri123, 1880;Jeffersonjac.Uon lltrald,june 17, 1881.June 29, 1883, and April 3, 1885; 
and Carrollton Ca,-oll County Ti,.ts,January 10, 1873, and Seplember I, 1882. 
" Carrollton Go,-ol/ County Ti"'"· May 3, 1878. 
"Carrollton Ca,-oll Fr11 Prm, May I, 1885. 
"'Ibid ., April 17, 1885. 
"Ibid., May I, 1885. The editor of !he Arhens, Georgia, Soulhtm Cultivator, XXXVI 
<January 1878). 8-9, alated the rights claim and the contradiction succinctly: "If one holds 
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Significantly, opponents and proponents of the stock law agreed on the 
desirability of protecting private property, but they disagreed on the best 
way to do so. Private property seemed commonsensical to rnen of the 
nineteenth-century upcoWltry. Thus, fence-law supporter "Fair Play" of 
Jackson CoWlty declared that "viewing the question from a strictly legal 
standpoint, it would seem to be just to enact some law whereby every one 
should be protected in the full use and enjoyment of whatever property 
rightfully belonged to him; as for instance it would appear meet and proper 
that the owner of lands should have the same right to restrain others from 
grazing stock on his premises as he would to prevent them from felling his 
timber. "12 Although Hahn leaves out the part of the letter by "Fair Play" just 
quoted, he does quote the succeeding lines: "Our present system is an old 
one-so old that it would seem cruel to attempt an innovation upon il From 
long usage our people have become accustomed toil, and any change in or 
abridgment of it will unquestionably work serious injury to a large number 
of our citizens." Far from reflecting a competing moral system or "expres-
sion of natural right," as Hahn contends, the whole statement by "Fair Play" 
accepts private property as moral but bemoans its consequence for those 
who would be losers if the open range were closed. This is hardly tanta-
mount to endorsing a "cooperative commonwealth" but rather represents a 
standard politieal appeal that has been used by the Right as well as the Left 
from time out of mind.13 
Agreement on the principle of private property left fence-law advocates 
open to charges of inconsistency: "Why is it," asked "Vande Linctum" of 
Jackson County, "that if I climb over my neighbor's fence, four and a half 
feet high, and cut, trample, break down, or in any manner injure or destroy 
his wheat, com, cotton or other crops, that the law punishes me, yet my 
stock may cross the very same fence and commit the same depredations and 
the law protects them?"'"' While Hahn admits that fence-law supporters 
believed in some private property rights, he contends that only stock-law 
advocates accepted what he tenns "absolute property" and that private 
property and free-grazing rights did not appear contradictory in nineteenth-
century upcountry society. But as the statement by "Fair Play" demonstrates, 
the fme distinction is Hahn's, not that of the debaters of the 1880s, and the 
contradiction was as evident to at least some nineteenth-century eyes as to 
those of the twentieth century." Although other fence-law supporters 
a ftt simple 10 land. h~ is ~nlitl~d to allth~ fruits and benefits of it. including pasturage. 
His n~ighbors hav~ no right to pastur~ their stock upon it. . . . If all your neighborsshouhl 
fenc~ in a/lthdr lands, your stock would b~ confin~d to your own land for support; hut 
you could not complain. for it is fully admiued th~y ha•·~ the right to enclose every acre 
they own.· 
"J~ffersonjac/uon llero/d, June 17, I BB I. 
" llahn. Roots of Southern Populi.Jm, 252 . 
.. J~ff<rsonjac/uon Htrald.Junc 10. 1881. A l~gal fence W OI$ fi•·e fc~t tall. 
"Hahn. Roots of Southtrn Populi.Jm, 251 (quotation), and 2~3 . 
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ignored the contradiction between the principle of private property and the 
practice of unimpeded grazing, their silence provides no evidence that they 
uplicitly questioned that principle, which Halm 's larger argument requires. 
Rather, free grazing was for them merely a convenient exception to the 
regime of private property. 
Since the decision on whether or not to enforce strict property rights 
would be made by voters in collective referenda rather than by individual 
bargainers in a market, a good deal of the debate consisted of appeals for 
support and attempts to shape coalitions. Although they did not use the 
phrase, stock-law proponents Wlderstood the concept of a Pareto improve-
ment (a change that makes at least one person better off without making 
anyone else worse off), and they freely admitted that their reform would not 
help everyone. "School Boy, .. for example, stated, "I will admit that there 
are a few men that it [the stock law) will not suit-though I think it will 
benefit twenty-five where it will injure one." In similar fashion, J. 0. R. 
Word reasoned, "Admitting the no fence Jaw would work a hardship 
against a few, would it not be the part of wisdom to legislate for the best 
good of many[?)" "Submuloc" of Jackson County agreed: .. We need not 
hope to please everybody, for that is impossible. Our object should be to 
promote the general good, and our motto 'Pro Bono Publico.' "16 In a 
system of majority rule, the proposed Jaw did not need to benefit everyone 
to be adopted. 
Some historians have asserted that the fence debate split the society into 
two neat groups. Flynn arrayed laborers and tenants of both races along 
with "very small fanners, the poorer end of the landowning class" on one 
side and richer white landowners on the other.17 Halm saw the combatants 
as "the mass of Upcounlry yeomen, tenants, and laborers" against "land-
lords, merchants, and business interests. "a This is not, however, the only 
possible division. If voters cast their ballots for the stock or fence law so as 
to maximize their expected incomes, if the market for labor was competi-
tive, and if transaction costs were so high that private agreements were not 
a viable solution, then the lineup of socioeconomic groups ought to have 
been more complex than Flynn and Halm claim. 19 
• Carrollton Carroll CouniJ Ti,..J, September I, 1882; Carrollton CarToll f,., P,u, 
May I, 1885; andjelfenonjocboa H~raltJ, March 20, 1885. 
" Flynn, Mill Larul, Bl.tA L<~6or, H5. 
u Hahn, Roou of Soulll•rn Populb•, 248 and 262 (quotations). 
11The competltlveneu of the postbellum oouthern labor market and the markedly free 
geognphic mobility of black laboren are diocuued in Robert Higgo, Co•JI•Iilior& 11nd 
CHrcio11: Bloch i111M 1\,..rit,.,. Etono.,. 186J-19H(Cambridge, London, and Melbourne, 
1977), 57-55; Stephen]. DcCanio, 1\frin.lltm in Ill• Polllullu111 Soulll: Tlu EcoNo111ia of 
Prodw:lum and Su;plJ (Cambridge, Mau., and London, 1974), 10. 76; Joseph D. Rcid,Jr., 
"Shareaopplng as an Undcntandablc Market Rcoponsc: The Post· Bellum South, • Jourft41 
of Econo111k Hut.?. XXXIII (March 1973), 106-30; Gavin Wright, Old Soulh, Nlfll Soulh: 
Rlvolutioru in t/u Soulh1m EconOIIIJ Sine• 1/u Civil WAr (New York, 1986), 64-70; and 
William Cohen, 1\1 Fr~~dowt'J Etlg1: BlocA Mo6ili1J 4nd lh1 Soulh1m Whil• Qw!lfor Racial 
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TABLE! 
OccuPA 110NS 01' HousE! toW IIEAos 
CARROlL AND JACKSON COllmlES, GOOROIA, 1880 
' White Household Heads ' BltJck Household Heads 
Occupation Carroll Jackson Carroll Jackson 
Farmer 
Landholding" 45.3 43.6 5.4 5.1 
Non-Landholding 25.3 10.0 37.0 4.0 
Laborer" 13.6 34.9 41.1 86.2 
Capitalists 
Trade• 2.9 2.3 0.0 0.1 
Professional' 3.1 3.1 0.8 0.5 
Service" 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 
Skilled and 
Semiskilled' 4.5 ).8 1.8 1.2 
Other Laborer 5.0 2.0 13.6 2.9 
Other 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
N' 2,683 2,086 389 896 
Agricultural N 2,264 1,845 325 854 
• The numbers In 111c Mlandholdln& rannerM and rann Mlabon:rM rows are substanllally different 
from 1hose !hat Hahn reports. The reason ls 1hat2SJ white and 44 black household heads ln Carroll 
and 173 whites and 34 blacks ln Jacksoa reponed lheir occupalions as Mfarmer" but were not 
recorded In 1he aaricuhunl census. We lhere[ore considered 1hese individuals as fann laborers. 
'Includes merdwll.s, arocers. olher shopkeepers, salupcoplc, and hucksters. 
' Include& lawyers, physicians, cleray, teachers, and political orrlcials. 
"'ncludes hotel, stable. warehouse, and saloon keepers. 
'Includes artisans and helpers likely 10 acquire a sklllaucb u •works In blocksmlth shop. M 
1Doesnot Include household heads reporlln& nooccupallon, Mkecpln& house, M or "student" and 
does not Include persons in jail or In the poorhouse. 
Souaca: Manuscript Population Schedules o[ Carroll and Jackson Counties, Oeorala. The data 
set Includes all houscbolds lhatlhc census cnumented. : 
F'Jtst. consider landowners. If the stock law passed and a landowner 
expected lobe a net loser, he or she would experience the full effect of the 
loss, all other things being equal. Clearly, as Flynn and Hahn argue, 
-Conlro4 1861-19" (Bacon Rouse and London, 1991), xi-xvi. Since there were dearly 
~any hLy:'n and aellen oflabor in the market, olnce (uthc population increaoe ligurco 
Cited ea:·;1er ahow) labor wao very mobile, and oince the: 1880o were rc:latively proopcrous 
yeara fo" oouthern [armcn, those who doubt that the labor market in the upcountry was 
compet!iiv~ bear a htavyburdcn of proof. Contemporarico recognilrd thio. As a stock-law 
IUpporter. Ill Coweta County, who waa tryins to convince tenants and rarm laborcn to 
~upport h11 •ide, put it in 1881: "Never wao(1hrre)auch demand [or work ohll kinds as 
In thea d • a C e aya. Newnan HmJid,June :'10, 1881. Moreover, stock-law aupporten concc:drol , 
t 1 ;rroll County's "SchoolBoy" affirmed: "We all know thotth(i)s black population vole 
horde nee and they are to prejudiced that whenrver the (otock] law is carried over thrir 
Cea 1 • they will at once leave without waitinsto ace whrther its(Jic] a good or bad law." 
arrollton CoiToll Coun11 Tiwtts, September I, 1882. 
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yeomen fanners who relied on the open range to feed their animals should 
have been solidly against any redefmition of property rights.110 Wealthy 
stock raisers, whom they do not mention, should also have opposed any 
change.9t Conversely, owners of land suitable for pasture but not as appro-
priate for growing crops should have expected to profit from the stock law 
and, consequently, should have been well disposed toward reform. 
If landowners could be expected to divide over the issue and tenants and 
laborers to support the fence law overwhebningly, as Hahn and Flynn 
contend, then stock-law supporters should have had no chance of success in 
these two counties. Table I shows the occupations of black and white 
household heads in Carroll and Jackson Counties. Tenants and laborers of 
both races made up substantial proportions of the voting populations in 
both counties, respectively 43.9 and 46.9 of the white and 91.7 and 93.1 of 
the black household heads. In addition, 72.4 percent and 57.6 percent of the 
white fann owners in Carroll and Jackson Counties, respectively, operated 
farms with less than fifty acres of tilled land. In swn, yeomen, tenants, and 
laborers were the overwhelming majority of the electorate in both counties, 
and if they acted as these historians say they did, there should have been no 
contest over the fence law. 
But tenants cannot so easily be placed in the fence-law camp on the basis 
of fll'St principles as Hahn and FlyM assert.92 hnagine a landowner and a 
00 Explicit calculations of the amount of money that each landowner and tenant in the 
two counties could have expected lo gain or lose from the stoclr.law In 1880 show that 52 
percent of the "winnins" landowners tilled fewer than forty acres and 40 percent of the 
"losins"landownen tilled more than forty acres. By this measure of malerialsclf-interesl, 
not every small farmer should have opposed the stock law and not every large farmer 
should heve favored il. Sec below for a fuller explanation of the "savings" measure. 
91 According to a Mr. Carmichael, "We have been eaten up by bigcouon planters' stock 
and their lenanla, and the widows and orphans of our county and our immediate 
neighborhood have had to abandon their little farms sinct the war, on account of these 
big men and their big herds of stock. • Procwli"g> of the Georgia State llcrlcultural Socirty, 
1876 to 1878, pp. 414-15. Ellickson found in Shasta Count)', California, that the impetus 
for a move to close the range came from the depredations of the animals belonging to a 
large cal!le rais<r and that, while many small properly holders favored a stock law, the 
major caule owners favored continuation of the open range. "OfCoase and Caule," 647-!>3. 
" We use the term "tenant" generically. For our purposes it is not important to 
distinguish among cash renters, shue tenants, or sharecroppers, because all three might 
or might not own animals and all might be able lo bargain for pasture rights. By "tenant" 
we mean to imply that the farmer did not own his or her land and therefore signed a 
contract with a landowner specifying, for example,lhe rent (in -kind or cash), the level of 
landowner supervioion, and the amoulll of forell and pasture provided by the owner, 
among other things. See leeJ. Alston and Robertlliggs, "Contractual Mix in Southern 
Agriculture Since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests, • Journal of Economic lliJtory, 
XLII Uune 1982), 327-53; Robert Higgo, "Race, Tenure, and Resource Allocation in 
Southern Agriculture, 1910," Journal of Economic lliJtory, XXXIll (March 1973), 149-69; 
Higgs, "Pallerns of Farm Rental in the Georgia Co!lon Bell, 1880-1900," Journal of 
Economic /liJiory, XXXIV Uune 1974), 468-82; Reid, "Sha1ecropping as an Understand-
able Markel Respome"; and Cavin Wright, Tht Political Economy of tht Cotton South: 
1/owtholdJ, MarA<IJ, and Wtalth in the Ninlltlnllo Ctnlury (New York, 1978), 160-80 for 
discussions of the contractual choices available to both the landowner and land ·poor. 
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tenant signing a contract stipulating that the landowner would furnish no 
pasture and therefore the tenant had to provide for his or her animals 
elsewhere. In the rental contract between James Willbanks and C. M. 
Wood, a landlord from Hannony Grove, Jackson County, for example, the 
subject of pasturage was made quite explicit. Not only was Willbanks "to 
take care of said farm as it was his own," but it was stated also that "there is 
to be noe pastureing on the land of said place that are in cultivation. 0093 lf the 
rental contract forbade pasturing on cultivated acreage and provided no 
pasture or unimproved land on which animals could forage, tenants then 
had four options: they could pen their animals and feed them purchased 
grain or fodder grown on their own small farms, send animals out into the 
forest to find food, rent pasture, or keep no animals.~~t Whether a tenant 
signed such an agreement or received pasture as part of the contract, the net 
income that each of these tenants expected to receive should have been 
roughly equal, holding everything else constant, if the market for labor was 
competitive across the region. Simple economic reasoning shows that 
wxler a fence-Jaw regime, any landlord in a competitive labor market 
would have to offer a tenant a contract of the same total value, substituting 
other incentives for pasiure, if he or she did not offer pasture. Otherwise, 
the landlord would attnct fewer tenants or less competent ones.05 Similar 
reasoning suggests that if the stock Jaw were adopted, competition for 
tenants should have compelled the landowner to compensate any tenant 
whose animals had previously been dependent on the open range by giving 
him or her pasture, taking a smaller share of the crop, or reducing the cash 
rent. As a group, therefore, tenants should have been indifferent between 
the stock and fence laws. A similar argwnent can be made with respect to 
the before and after wages of farm laborers. 96 
91 
"Day Book of C. M. Wood," in doe A.D. O'Rear Collection (Georgia Department of 
Archives and llistory, Atlanta). 
14 1n Carroll County 714 of 910 tenant fanners (78 percent) reported no pasture or 
unimproved land, and in Jackson County 144 of3H tenants (42 percent) were in the same 
situation, according to our 100 percent sample of the 1880 Agricultural Manuscript 
Schedules of the U. S. Census. Thiscensus, of course, predated the adoption oCt he stock 
law anywhere in either county. 
"'In the 1880 census, 5 percent of the tenants and 18 percent of the farm owners in 
Carroll County reported having pasture. In Jackson County, the proportions wore 15 
percent and 34 percent, respectively. Ninety·sevento 98pcrcent of the landowners in the 
two counties reported having pasture, forest, or unimproved land on their )>laces, 
compued to 22 percent of the Carroll County tenants and (iO percent of those in Jackson 
County. Nearly evcry landowner in both counties reported o•ming at least one non-draft 
animal, as did 89 percent of the tenants in Jackson County and 96 percent in Carroll 
County. Three conclusions may !,., drawn. First , especi;olly in Carroll County, large 
numbers of tenants must have loosed their animals on the land of I heir landlords or on 
that of neighbors; for lhese people, the imposition of the stock law posed atleastohort-
term difficuhies. Second, nearly all landowners load somc a•·ailaLie unimproved land 
where if water was available, stock could be pastured. Third, even before the stock law, 
some farmers-a third oft he owners inJackson County-did fence in their animals, despite 
the lack of a law requiring i1 ; for them, the stock law was a pu re benefit. 
'"Since holdings of animals were II. ted only in the agricuhural schedule of the U.S. 
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Contemporaries understood the logic of market competition well. Jack-
son County's "Progress" asserted that the stock law would make both 
landowners and their tenants better off. "The income of tenants and wages 
of hirelings will be regulated by the profits of the land owners .... Renters 
now demand houses for their families, and why not demand, under the new 
law, pasturage for their stock with the same propriety? This they will do, 
and receive it at far less cost to the owner than is required to repair fences." 
Similarly, the Jefferson Jackson Herald editorialized: "It is pure fallacy to 
say that the laborer or tenant, or, as the demagogues have it, the poor man, 
will suffer by it. The man who will have the burden to bear will be the man 
who owns the land. He will be compelled to furnish pasturage for his 
tenants or not get them, and it is impossible for him to do without help." 
''Tenant" believed that "whoever furnishes the best pastures will certainly 
get the best tenants, as it is all bosh about the land-holder being more 
independent than the tenant, for what is his land worth to him without 
labor?" In Rockdale County, which was one of the first to pass the stock 
law, the editor of the county newspaper observed that "landlords see who 
can arrange the best pastures to secure the best tenants. "91 
This analysis is supported, rather than undermined, by the constant 
assertions from the fence-law side that the stock law would damage tenants. 
The reason that they showed unusual concern for the poor, even for the 
black poor, while they made less direct appeals to cattle raisers and farmers 
who lived in sparsely settled areas, we suggest, is that the interests of the 
latter two groups were much more obvious than those of tenants. Tenants 
received so much attention in the debate because they were the swing 
voters. The same logic, moreover, suggests that there was no widespread 
coercion of tenants by landlords to vote one way or another in these secret 
ballot elections: if tenants' votes could be easily won through pressure, 
cenaua and aince only l:indownen and tenanll were liated in thatachedule, itla imponible 
to determine exactly what percentage of wage laborer• owned animals. If a laborer did 
own a cow or pig and if he kept the animal on the open range, he would experience a 
decrease in real income when the atock law waa impoaed because he would have had either 
to rent puture and purchase feed or to sell the animal. Alternatively, a laborer who owned 
no animala waa probably indifferent between the two laws, at least in the ahort run. If he 
expected to own atock eventually, then he might have favored the open range. (Since the 
average age of both white and black household heada who were wage laboren waa leu 
than that of cub renten and ownen in both Carroll and Jackson Countiea in 1880, 
laboren may have expected to move up the agricultural ladder u they aged.) However, 
aince improved acreage would have increased and fence• for past urea needed to be built 
if the atock law were enacted, the ahort-lerm demand for wage labor migh1 have increased 
in that cue, cauaing upward preasure on wages. Overall, in the long run, the competilive 
market for labor ahould have equalized the wage of laboren in s1ock-law area• with that 
of those in nearby opcn..,..n&e lands, leas moving coolS. 
"Jefferson Jacluon Htrald, June 24, 1881 ("Progress" quotation), June 10, 1881 
(secondquotalion),Scptember25, 1885("Tenant" quotation); and unidentified Rockdale 
Counly newapaper, quoted ibid., Auguat 24, 1883. Similarly, see A. R. Burch, in Newnan 
Htrald,June 30, 1881 ;J. B. McDaniel of Henry County, in Carrollton Carro// CouniJ r;,.,., 
Augull4, 1882; andjeiTenon]arluon Htrald, October :JI, 1884, and AugustS I, 1885. 
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why bother appealing to their intellects? 
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Some renters, such as future Populist I. H. P. Beck, announced, "I am 
going to vote for 'no fence' because I think it will be to my interest to do so 
and every other renter," while other debaters disagreed.91 Thus, an anony-
mous writer in Catroll County declared that the stock law 
is ultimately going to be the ruin of the people and most especially the poor 
people that have no where to keep their stock. They arc entirely dependent upon 
the land owners for pasture for which he will charge them more than double 
what their milk and cow is worth .. .. There is not one man out of ten that will 
let them have pasture room free of rent. ... It is time now for the poor people 
to open their eyes and to come forward and stand up for their rights and ilot 
allow themselves to be led by the cliMing land owners any longer and to come 
out and say that we want a fence and tum out en masse and cany the election 
for a fence .... 99 
Landowner "L. F. L." asked, "How many of us Carroll people have lands to 
spare f-.>r pasture. How many of you colored and renters are able to pay Mr. 
A. or C. two or three dollars a month to keep your cow in his pasture, and 
pay your rent.""10 Lindsay J. Jones of Snake's Creek, who as·a member of 
the Democratic county executive committee in 1892 fought against the 
Populists, put the rhetoric most picturesquely: "I want to say to tht voters of 
Carroll county, that we as poor men, and negroes, do not need the [stock] 
law, but we need a democratic government and independence, that will do 
the common people good. If the rich men wants to put their stock up in pens 
aU right." 101 Or, as one tenant farmer bluntly observed, "This [stock] law 
will simply take rights away from the poor man and give them to the 
rich."1az 
The material conditions of SOOle fence-law supporters lent a discordant 
note to their apparentiy radical appeals to lower-class interests. John Stogner 
owned a fann worth two thousand dollars, nearly four times that of the 
average fannin CanoU County in 1880. Although he reported no penna-
nent pasture to census officials, Stogner did possess thirteen cows and 
cattle, fifteen swine, and forty sheep, and he planted ten acres of cotton and 
twenty-five of com. During the 1880s, he had a sufficiently large herd that 
he drove them to Atlanta to market. •m But to listen to his rhetoric, he was a 
• Carrotllon Carroll Fu1 Puu, May 15, 1885. For a airnilar alalemenl, ace It N. 
Timmons, i6id.,June 19, 1885. 
"lb'd.,june 19, 188!1. 
100 !tid., April 24, 188!1. Moat rcporll of aimilar argumen11 come from atocJ.,.(aw 
propon,.nu who stale lhcm and 1hcn allempllo refute lhcm. See, t.g.,Jdfeuon 'Foml 
Ntws, May 14, 1880;Jefferaon]acbon lltra/d,Junc 10, 1881, Augusl24, 1883, Augusl2, 
31, 188~·. and February 26 and March 5, 1886; Carrolhon Carroll Frtt Prtu , May I, 1885; 
and Chari one (N.C.l D .. ootrat, quolcd in Soutlotm Cultivator, XXXIV (May 1876), 178-79. 
101 Carrolllon Carroll Frtt Prtu, May 15, 1885. For Jonca'a membership on the county 
execulive commillce, sec ibid., April 8, 1892. 
tOI Quoled in Flynn, Whitt Land, BlacA Ldor, 131. 
101 Carrolhon Ca=ll Frtt Prm, May 20, 1887. 
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representative of another class. He condemned the stock law as "the 
greatest curse upon the poor laborer that has been since the civil war. We 
were told in 1859 that secession was the greatest thing that the South could 
do, so it was to lead her into destruction. It was a rich mans war and a poor 
mans fight, so will the stock law be a benefit to a few landlords who have 
plenty of water on their lands while nine tenths of the people will be in a 
deplorable condition." If the stock law passed, according to Stogner, "the 
common laborer will be the ones that will be the sufferers ... and why 
should we try [to] oppress this class any worse. God makes the grass[,) the 
mountaines crown, and com in valleys grow, so lets not try to deprive our 
poor neighbors from receiving his blessing .... " Abner Nixon, whose 
farm was worth one thousand dollars and who valued his livestock at the 
not inconsiderable sum of two hundred dollars, added a historical note to 
predictions of the law's effect: "The stock law will divide the people of this 
county into classes similar to the patricians and plebians of anci·~nt Rome, 
which unhappy division, was the source of much contention, injustice, 
violence and blood shed, and ftnally the overthrow of the republic, the 
kingdom and the empire, and brought on the dark ages of the world. "11M 
Some stock-law supporters lent credence to the class oppression charges 
of their critics. Although he himself held no land, "L." contended that "the 
non land holding class have no right to vote on this subject. "1os Favoring a 
property qualification for every election and accusing a fence-law propo-
nent of being pro-black, "L." thought it "sensible ... to allow the landholders 
to say, whether they shall fence their lands or not. . .. Well do I know, to 
my sorrow, that the negroes and one fourth of the whites have been allowed 
the privilege of going to the ballot box! That is what is the matter with the 
countiy today!" 106 One bizarre proposal even aimed to disfranchise land-
owners who had not erected fences around their land.107 
While disavowing support for black suffrage, fence-law proponents 
condemned these disfranchisement proposals. Philo H. Chandler, a Demo-
cratic party leader from the Kansas district of Carroll County during the 
1880s and 1890s who later became a stock-law supporter, denounced "such 
a law to prohibit any one from voting [as] wickedness in the eye of the law, 
and the eye of God." Moves to disfranchise all blacks or propertyless 
whites, he wrote, "are tyrannical and we are opposed to them from the fact 
that we live in an independent government by the people. "101 "Mill Boy" 
'"' Ibid ., June 26, 1885. 
10
' Carrollton Corroll County Timu, May 3, 1878. 
'"Ibid., June 7, 1878. For •imilu commenu, Jee Thom» I'. Jane•. Annuol Rtport of 
CommiJ•iontr of Agnculturt oftht Stolt ofGtorgiofor thel'ear I Bn (A1lanto, 1876). 66; and 
Procttding> oflht Ctorgia Stolt Ag>icul/ural Socitl.y, 1876 lo 1878, pp. 419-22. In 1891 the 
Georgia Jlale legislaiUrc considered and overwhelmingly rcjcc1ed a billlo di•franchisc 
non·landowners in Jlock·law eleclions . Sec Carrollton Canol/ Frtt Pms, Augu•l 7, 1891. 
10 1 Carrollton Carroll County Tim<S, May 3 and June 7, 1878; and JcffcnonjacAson 
lltrald , April 3, 1885. 
100 Carrolllon Carroll County TimtJ , May 17 (linl qu olalion) and June 21 (second 
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responded to the proposition of "L." by asserting that ~if he can scratch out 
that clause in the corntitution that entitles them [blacks] to vote, I dont 
suppose that there are many Mill Boys that would cry about it. But sir, for 
God's sake dont disfranchise a white man, just because he is poor. "109 · 
Proponents of the stock law, disturbed by the actual or potential appeal 
of their critics' argwnent that tenants would be hurt by abandoning free 
grazing, convinced the state legislature to amend state law. After 1881, in 
subcoWlty militia districts where the stock law was voted into effect, but 
not in whole coWlties, landlords were legally required to furnish tenants 
with sufficient pasture to acconunodate one cow and one calf, provided that 
the tenant shared the work of fencing. 110. Contemporary debaters were well 
aware of this legal guarantee. When "Ripples" cited it before a coWltywide 
election, ~con" wrote in the next week, pointing out that it applied only to 
arrangements adopted in district referenda. 111 
Thus, each side fought for the tenants' support in the usual ways of 
political campaigners, raising fears on the one hand and seeking to allay 
them on the other. Had tenants' interests been more obvious, there would 
not have been such a loud debate, and they would have voted tnore 
overwhelmingly for the fence law than they in fact did, as we show below. 
Landowners, tenants, and laborers were not the only socioeconomic 
categories that were relevant to the fence-law controversy. Twenty-one 
percent of the household heads in the two coWlties in 1880 were African 
Americans. In the context of southern political campaigns in the 1880s, the 
fence-law controversy generated relatively little race-baiting. Since nearly 
everyone expected blacks to vote overwhelmingly against the stock law, it 
is surprising that there were as few charges as there were that fence-law 
supporters wished "to array ignorant negroes against intelligent white 
people." 112 Instead, those who favored the stock law often asserted that 
blacks, as well as many whites, did not properly Wtderstand their own 
interests. "The negroes," said S. B. Orr, for example, "oppose it through 
prejudice and ignorance. "113 Whatever traditional yeoman conununity there 
was in the upcoWltry, blacks did not fit into it comfortably, and both sides 
quotation), 1878. Chamller com·erted lo the stock-law side by 1882. For this switch and 
his later Democratic party leadership, see ibid., july 7 and August 18, 1882, and june 6, 
1884; and Carrollton CaiTo// Frtt Prm, July 8, 1892. 
100 Carrolhon Carrol/ Count1 Timts, lllay 17 and june 21 (quotation), 1878. 
110 Ga. Acts . . . 1880.81, No. 401, pp. 79-81. This provision increased the proportion 
of tenants who could be: expected to benefit from the imposition orthe stock law from 47 
to 80 in Carroll County, and from 30 to 71 in Jackson County. l'or details of these 
calculations, sec Kantor, "Razorbacl<s," 877-78. 
111 Carrollton Carroll County 1'imtJ, s~ptemhcr I aml 8, 1882. 
1
" S<e, t.g.,jeffersonjacAson Htrald,June 10 and 24, 1881, and Oclober 31, 188·1; 
Carrollton Carroll Count1 Ti.,ts, September I, 1882; and Carrollton Carroll Frttl'rw, !\lay 
I, 1885 (quotation). 
"'Carrollton Carroll Frtt Prtu, May 22. 1885. Similarly, see Newnan lltraltl, 
July 7, 1881. 
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appealed to them largely in their economic roles as tenants and wage 
laborers, rather than as African Americans per se.114 It was another sign of 
the economic, rather than cultural, nature of the homespun debate. 
Hahn treats the residents of small towns as merely commercial interests, 
neglecting the fact that their gardens and noses had much to gain from 
controls on stray pigs and cows. 115 While to a twentieth-century suburban-
ite the issue may be merely symbolic, to a nineteenth-century villager it 
may well have been primarily olfactory. Although they made up only 13 
percent of the household heads in 1880, before the completion of the major 
railroads that served the two counties, townspeople provided a core of 
support for the stock law. 116 1n 1886 Carrollton imposed the stock law by 
town ordinance.l 17 In the 1881 election in Jackson County, the two most 
"wban" of the county's eleven precincts provided 48 percent of the 
countywide vote in favor ofthe stock law.111 
To test the Flynn/Hahn two-class model against more complex alterna-
tives, we focus on the five countywide referenda on the stock law held in 
Carroll County from 1881 to 1890-in January 1882, September 1882, 
July 1885, July 1887,and July 1890-and the two held in Jackson County 
in July 1881 and September 1883.119 In addition, we use information from 
local option elections in many of the militia districts, which were sporadi-
cally and incompletely reported in the newspapers. We pay particular 
attention to changes in the voting patterns over time. 
Although the fence side consistently attracted a majority of those casting 
ballots in both counties, there are two important trends in the data, only the 
fust of which has been stressed by previous historians (see Table 2). The 
fence law gradually lost support throughout the 1880s. As the time-series of 
turnout figures demonstrates, however, this decline was overshadowed by 
the dramatic decrease in participation on both sides of the issue. 120 The 
more numerous elections in Carroll County most clearly show the rise and 
faU of the fence debate's fwy. An increase in voter turnout by abnost 17 
percentage points between January and September 1882 is certainly an 
114jcffcrsonJoclloll Hno14,junc 10, 188 I, and Aupst24, 1883; and Carrollton C..rroll 
Fr11 Prm, April 24 and May J!i, 188!1. 
111 Hahn, RooU of Soutlama Poflululll, 256-57. 
11
' Thirteen percent of houtchold heads told census taken thai they resided within 
town limill. The proportion of people 11\·ins in civil divisions that contained towns wu 
much larger. In 1890, for instance, 43.2 percent of Carroll County's population lived in 
the civil divioions that contained Carrollton, Villa Rica, and Temple. The proportion of 
townspeople by thia measure in jackson County was only about half as large as that in 
Carroll. 
117 Carrollton C..rroll Fru Pr1ss, March 26, I 886. 
no jclfenonjocllon H~ro/4,july 8, 1881. 
'"Complete returns arc reported in Kantor, "Property Rishll and the Dynamics of 
Institutional Change: The Closing of the Georgia Open Range, 1870- 1900" (Ph.D. diu., 
California Institute ofTechnoloBY, 1991), 92-94 . 
110 Hahn, Roou ofSocllhtm Poflulis• , 266-67, no tea the decline in partlclpalion but doc• 
not emphasize that it wu nearly equal on both sides of the fence. 
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TABLE2 
TRENDs IN VOTING AND TURNoi!T IN STOCK-lAw RmlRENDA 
IN CARROlL AND JACKSON COUtn'IES, GEOROIA, 1881-1890 
Carroll County 
January 1882 
September 1882 
July 1885 
July 1887 
July 1890 
Jackson County 
July 1881 
September 1883 
% of Votes Thmour in % 
for Stock lAw of Adult Males 
27.7 
28.9 
33.3 
35.7 
38.6 
25.7 
32.7 
62.3 
79.2 
59.9 
50.2 
19.1 
54.5 
57.5 
SouaCI!.I: CanoUtoa (01 .) Co"ol/ Co•nty nmtl, liDUII)' 131Jld September 15,1882; 
Curollton (01.) Carroll Frt~ Prtss, July 3, JIU, July I, 1117,1Pd July 4, 1190; 1nd 
Jefferson (0•.) Jod:.son H~rold, July I, 1111, 1nd September 14, 1813. 
indication of the intense competition between the fence- and stock-law 
factions. As the editor of the Carrollton Carroll County Times remarked 
after the second ballot in his county: "No election for a long time in Carroll 
bas excited more interest than the electiOQ last Saturday on the fence 
question. Exciting the interest it did, of course there was a full vote polled-
larger, we believe. than any we have had in a long time."111 By 1885 the 
intensity on both sides began to wane-ahnost twenty percentage points 
fewer eligible voters cast ballots-and the stock law gained marginally at 
the polls as a result of the diminished interest. By 1890 turnout in the stock-
law referendum fell to only 19 percent If Populism was, among other 
things, an outgrowth of the fence-law struggle, it seems counterintuitive 
that the temperature of the controversy cooled as the 1890s approached. 
While proponents of the stock law were able to increase their relative 
share of the electorate over time. their base of support in Carroll County 
was quite WlStable. Table 3 displays the transition matrices between the 
fltSt and second elections in Carroll and Jackson Counties, and between the 
second and third elections in Carroll. 111 The transition matrices contain 
ltl Carrollton Carroll Coun17 Tilflll, Sepu~mber 15, 1882. 
Itt Since the number of diotricll in Carroll County waoomall and since the relationship• 
between the pre· and post-1885 election• were very nonlinear, violating the assumptions 
nc:cc:soary to c:otimatc: traruition matrices, we confine our analysis here to the elections 
through 1885. 
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TABLE3 
TRANSITION MATRICES 
JAcKsoN AND CARROlL CouNTms, GEoRGIA 
Panel A: Carroll County, January-September /882 Elections 
StPTEMilER 
% Fence %Stock %Abstain 
%Fence 0.920 0.052 0.028 
JA.NIIARY %Stock 0.036 0.671 0.293 
%Abstain 0.286 0.196 0.518 
Mean 0.603 0.197 0.200 
Panel B: Carroll County, September 1882-July 1885 Elections 
SI 'I'I'EMIIER 
1882 
%Fence 
%Stock 
%Abstain 
Mean 
%Fence 
0.764 
O.ot5 
0.178 
0.430 
Jutv 1885 
% Stock % Abstain 
0.034 0.202 
0.500 0.485 
0.590 0.233 
0.181 0.390 
Panel C: Jackson County, 1881 to 1883 Elections 
1883 
1881 
%Fence 
%Stock 
%Abstain 
Mean 
% Fence 
0.660 
0.002 
0.283 
0.383 
% Stock % Abstain 
0.023 0.317 
0.994 0.004 
0.107 0.610 
0.181 0.436 
Mean 
0.496 
0.135 
0.369 
Mean 
0.603 
0.197 
0.200 
Mean 
0.400 
0.139 
0.461 
estimates of the probability that voters who supported one side in one 
election continued supporting that position, switched to the other side, or 
abstained from voting in a subsequent contest. 123 While an estimated 92 
percent of the fence-law voters in Carroll's firSt election in January 1882 
voted for the status quo again in September of that year, only 67 percent of 
the stock-law voters continued their support in September. Moreover, of 
those who voted for the stock law in Jaimary, 29 percent simply did not vote 
the second time. This is surprising, since the interval between the two 
elections was so short and since overall turnout rose by 17 percentage 
points from the firSt to the second contest. It is interesting to note that 
'" 1\ecauoc: some estimates calculated by ordinary least "luares fell ouuide tlae logical 0-
100 percent bounds, we have estimated rhe equations undcolring tlocsc Lablcs in logit form. 
For a discussion of the usc of rhc legit transformation in ecological regression, sec J. Morgan 
Kousscr, "Making Separate E<Jual: lnlegrationofBiaek and Wloitc School Funds in Kentucky." 
Journal of /ntnduciplinary llutory, X (Winlcr 1980), 399-428. For details of the estimation 
procedures in this paper, sec Kantor, "Property Righu,• 86-88 n61. 
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almost 29 percent of the nonvoters in the ftrst election supported the fence 
law in the second election, while about 20 percent of the newly mobilized 
cast their franchises for the stock-law position. 
Panel B of Table 3, which contains estimates of behavioral continuity 
and change in Carroll CoWity from the September 1882 election to the one 
in July 1885, shows an even greater pattern ofvolatility, especially on the 
stock-law side. Of those who voted for the new institution in September 
1882, only half remained faithful through the next election, and almost half 
abstained. Stock-law proponents attracted 59 percent of those who had not 
voted in 1882; otherwise, the stock law's showing in 1885 would certainly 
have been even more meager. Conversely, the fence-law faction was able 
to maintain approximately three-fourths of its support over this period, with 
most of the remainder abstaining in the later election. In smn, Carroll 
COWity's stock-law coalition did not vote with the vigor that we would 
expect from a self-conscious class of "merchants, big landlords, and other 
commercial interests" out to impose a new economic order with themselves 
in social and economic control. Moreover, the interests of fence-law 
supporters were apparently either so obvious that they did not need an 
organization to succeed or, contrary to Hahn's claim, they were able to 
"develop an organizational apparatus to mobilize their ranks and inspire 
confidence in their nwnerical strength. "t,.. 
Panel C of Table 3 shows that Jackson CoWity's stock-law coalition was 
extremely cohesive between 1881 and 1883. The fence-law side retained 
two-thirds of its backers over the same period and gained about 28 percent 
of those who had abstained at ftrst Although the stock-Jaw group was able 
to hold its support in Jackson CoWity through 1883, the law's proponents 
were continuously overpowered by the nwnerical strength of the fence-law 
advocates. Canoll County's stock-law voters, by contrast, were too fickle 
and too few to prevail at the county level. tll 
Frustrated by their repeated coWitywide defeats, stock-law supporters 
began to concentrate their attention on adopting the law at the militia-
district level. By the 1887 countywide election in Carroll, eight of the 
fifteen districts had adopted the stock law in district referenda. In four of 
these eight districts, however, the fence law had originally been declared 
the victor, but after being contested on the groWid of ballot fraud, the 
Carroll County Ordinary Qudge) overturned the results and declared the 
'"Hahn. Rools ofSoulhern PopuliJm, 256 (first quotation) and 267 (second quotation). 
Note that Carroll County stock-law supporters did not shift or drop out before 188g as a 
rc:sult of district dection vicaorieS, ~cause, as far as we know from the newspapers, there 
were no district-only stock-law referenda in the county brfore 1884. 
"' "F-tests" for the "null" hypothesis that there was no statistical r<lationship between 
voting in each pair of elections yield values of 12.9, 6.0, and 15.0 for panels A, 8 , and C, 
respectively, which means that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the .0 I level in every 
instance_ "R.squares" for the log it equations in each pan<! are 0.691 for panel A, 0.512 for 
panel 8, and 0. 779 for panel C. All are reasonably good fits. 
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districts stock-law areas. 126 1be precise wording of the law, no doubt, 
confused the voters: the county election ballots were required to read either 
"fence" or "no fence," the latter meaning the sloe k law. The district election 
ballots, however, had to be either "for fence" or for the "stock law. "Tile 
election in Carroll's Bowdon district was particularly muddled: the pte· 
cinct managers certified the result in favor of the fence law 102 to 73; 
however, the actual vote cast was 73 for "stock law," 68 "for fence," 30 for 
"fence," 2 for "a fence," and 2 for "the fence." 1be Carroll Cotmty 
Ordinary, after hearing arguments from both sides, threw out 33 votes not 
cast "for fence," thus leaving a majority of 3 votes for the stock law. 127 In 
the remaining four districts, however, the stock law won unequivocal 
majorities. 
Thus, by taking advantage of legal changes and ambiguities and by 
concentrating their attention on the much smaller districts, stock-law sup-
porters were able to close the open range of Carroll and Jackson Counties 
little by little. 1be election rules were designed by the legislature to allow 
stock-law supporters to prevail in the areas that mattered most to them, 
those closest to either their farms or town property .121 Once a district was 
recorded as voting for the stock law, that decision could not be reversed. As 
more and more districts jumped the fence, the area of open range and, 
therefore, its value to any stock owner in fence-law territory declined. 
Since more than half of Canoll County's districts were already tmder the 
stock-law rule by July 1887, it is not surprising that only about half of the 
eligible voters cast ballots in that month's countywide stock-law election. 
Within the next tlvee years, five more districts imposed the stock law, and 
turnout in the 1890 contest plwnmeted to 19 percent. The decrease was 
IN It iJ difikuh to conoiderSamuelj. Brown, the Carroll Coumy Ordinary in 1887, an 
agent of capitalism or one of the "agrarian bourgeoisie." In 1880 the only man named S. 
J. Brown in the county lived in Carrollton but owned a twenty-acre farm worth $500, of 
which he tilled thirteen acreo. He apparently kept his one horse, one cow, one other head 
of canle, and aeven pigs in a one-acre paature; or perhaps to prevent overgrazing on hio 
own land, he allowed aome of them to run at large. According to our meaaure of 
proopective gaino and loasea ifthe atoddaw were adopted, which we explain below, Brown 
would hne gained the amalloum of$40.74 ifthe stock law had been adopted in 1880.In 
the 1894 tax recorda, he ioliated u owning fifty acrea valued at $200 in the Bowdon dlatrict 
but no town or paper aaaeu. His total wealth waa reported to be $325. By comparison, the 
average wealth of the thirty.four members of the Populiot county executive comminee in 
that yearwaa $6!5, and that of the fifty-three memberaohhe Democratic county executive 
comminee wu $1,754. See Kantor, "Property Righta," 280. Even allowing for a pouible 
undentatement of his reoourceo, it doeo not aeem that Brown was a rich man. 
117 Carrollton C.rroll Fr11 Prm, March 18 and 25, 1887. 
Ill The aucceu of plan ten and townspeople in convincing the lcgiolature to change the 
rule a on 11ock-law voting In 1881 contram dramatically with the apparent inability of the 
largeot capitalistlnterell in the otate, the railroads, to craft the llock-law rules in their 
favor. Since animals who wandered onto the tracks olowed traino and caused lawsuits, 
railroada, which by the 1880s otretched throughout the llate, had a conoiderable otake in 
lmpooing the otock law llalewide. If capitalistic interests increasingly dominated the 
otate'a politico, as Hahn lmplieo, one would expect that railroado would have had more 
influence in the llock-law controveny than they did. 
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TABLE4 
WERE STOCK-LAW SlJPI'ORTERS CUL11JRAL IMPBUAIJSTS? 
TuRNolTT AND SUPPORT roR nm Fe~eE LAw IN CARROLL Coul'fl'Y, GEORGIA, 
~A, 1882-1890 
Election Date When District Adopted Stock Law for Itself 
Before 1887 1887-1890 After 1890 
Panel A: Turnout in Percentage of Eligible Voters 
January 1882 County 59.9 64.3 73.9 
September 1882 County 75.0 87.1 88.7 
1885 County 57.4 63.8 69.0 
District 61.5 
1887 County 41.6 65.2 71.2 
District 61.3 
1890County 12.9 23.8 55.8 
District 72.3 
Panel B: Percentage in Favor of Fence Law' 
January 1882 County 37.7 
September 1882 County 47.9 
1885 CoWlty 59.4 
District 47.8 
1887 County 55.7 
District 
1890 County 46.4 
District 
56.4 
70.6 
78.5 
71.8 
51.9 
69.7 
67.3 
79.0 
81.9 
81.9 
78.8 
50.9 
NoTE: • These arc lhc orl&lnal returns, some of which were lhrown oul by lhc Carroll County 
Ordinary. Some dislrlcls voted more lhan once. 
most dramatic in the stock-law districts. 129 Table 4 shows Carroll County's 
voter turnout and election results for three types of districts: those that 
adopted the stock law by the 1887 countywide election, those that adopted 
after the 1887 election but before the 1890 contest, and finally, those 
districts that did not adopt the law until after 1890. The table tracks voter 
activity from 1882 to 1890, including district referenda, where the returns 
were available. What is apparent from Panel A of Table 4 is that once 
districts adopted the stock law, many voters apparently felt that the costs of 
casting a ballot for either option were too high to justify a trip to the polls.no 
111 See Carrollton C4rroll Fr11 PriU,july 18, 1890; and Bonner, CtorJiai LaJI Fronlitr, 
14S. 
110 See Anthony Downa, An EconoMit n •• , of DIM OCTO" (New York, 1957), Chal'· 11. 
for a diacusaion of calcu1;ationa on lhe quc:lllon of whether or nollo vole. 
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The fiJ'St group of districts sent 75 percent of their eligible voters to the 
polls in September 1882. In the 1885 countywide and district referenda and 
in later elections after these districts adopted the stock law, turnout de-
clined, falling to 41.6 percent in 1887 and to a low of 12.9 percent in 1890. 
The second set of districts followed the same general pattern, with turnout 
in excess of 60 percent in January and September 1882, 1885, 1887, and in 
their district elections but only 23.8 percent in the 1890 countywide ballot. 
In regions where the open range continued to be argued actively, however, 
voters continued to go to the polls in large nwnbers. Of the voters who lived 
in districts that retained the open range through the 1890 election, 55.8 
percent went to the polls in the last countywide election, and 72.3 percent in 
referenda in their own districts-in striking contrast to the 12.9 and 23.8 
percent turnout in the districts that had already adopted the stock law for 
themselves. And as Panel B of Table 4 shows, the open-range districts 
voted faithfully for the fence law in county referenda throughout the 
election process. 
Tables 3 and 4 mar Hahn's image of helpless partisans of common rights 
overwhelmed by a juggernaut of merchants and rich farmers who repre-
sented the impersonal free market. 131 Fence-law partisans won all seven 
countywide elections in the two counties from 1881 to 1890; and their 
pattern of support was, on the whole, much less volatile than that of their 
opponents. Even more serious for Hahn's thesis, after gaining the adoption 
of their preferred arrangement in their own districts, most stock-law sup-
porters abstained in subsequent countywide referenda, rather than seeking 
to impose their views on open-range areas. nus is not a conclusion that 
depends on even the very simple statistical analysis of election returns 
presented in Table 4, for contemporaries repeatedly commented on the 
issue. For instance, the pro-stock law Carrollton Carroil Free Press agreed 
with a correspondent who thought it "wrong for the county to pass on the 
question as to whether they should have the stock law in his district as the 
policy has been heretofore to let the districts act upon this matter for 
themselves." 1be proper policy, the editor wrote, was to "let each district 
work out its own salvation, but don't force it on a district whether they are 
willing or not. "132 Another correspondent, from a district that voted in favor 
of imposing the stock law on itself in May 1890 but against requiring it for 
the whole county little more than a month later, declared, "We got it by 
district election and we did not believe it was right to force it on those 
districts who did not have a majority to get themselves."133 
On the same day in 1890 that Carroll County stock-law supporters 
abstained in droves, the same voters decided another issue in a local 
"' llahn, Roots of Southern PopuliJm, 262 and 267. 
,. Carrollton Carroll Frtt Prm,Junr 27, 1890. 
"'Ibid., july 18, 1890. 
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referendum. Bitterly contested for years, the proposal to issue bonds to 
erect a new county cowthouse attracted 1,432 ballots in districts that had 
adopted the stock law. But strikingly, only 650 of the same voters who had 
already assumed the cost of going to the polls in the two-issue election 
bothered to express their opinions on the coWltywide fence question. In 
those districts where the stock law was not yet in force, however, there were 
204 ballots on the bond question and 210 on the stock law .134 This special 
"allegiance to local control" displayed in the 1890 election is a clear 
indication that fence refonners were not engaged in any sweeping plan to 
restructure the social or cultural basis of their economy. 135 Their goal, 
instead, was to restructure property rights in specific local geographic areas 
where economic efficiencies could be captured through a redefmition of the 
tort liability regarding animals and fences. 
If the analysis of changes in the overall vote totals partially alters the 
nature of the conflict as depicted by previous historians, it does not uncover 
the socioeconomic coalitions on each side, and it casts only a limited light 
on voters' motives. Did men vote for the fence law in order to voice their 
objections to the encroaching capitalist market and preserve a traditional 
comnumity of rough equals, as Hahn contends? Did the fence-law conflict, 
as both Aynn and Halm assert, divide this agricultural society into two 
distinct classes? Or, do the voting patterns suggest a more complex pattern 
of divisions, as our economic self-interest model implies? 
The rich data available allows us to address these questions in more than 
one way. Let us first consider the order in which the militia districts in 
Carroll County adopted the stock law. If the self-interest thesis is correct, 
then those districts in which farmers should have expected to gain the most 
from the imposition of the stock law should have adopted it fust, while 
those in which more farmers benefited monetarily from the fence law 
should have dragged their collective feet. Using our I 00 percent sample of 
the 1880 agricultural census manuscript returns, we have constructed a 
measure of the extent of the savings or losses for each district in the two 
coWlties if the stock law had been put into force instantaneously in that 
year.136 We then calculated Spearman's Rho, a rank-order correlation 
'"Ibid., july 4, 1890. As their correspondent "Martin" ofSmithlidd noted after the 
1890 declion, "We got it (the llock law( by district election and we did not believe it was 
right to force it on those districts who did not have a majority to get themselves. So our 
motto was fence and no bonds."/bid,July 18, 1890. 
"'Quotation from Bonner, Gtorgio'J LiJJI Fronlur, 143. 
'"To approximate the txpectrd savings or loss, we estimated the amount of land 
wasted by fence rows within <ach diSirict and calculated the value of crops that could ha>·e 
been grown on that land, less the cost or growing them. Next, we assigned livestock to 
available pasturage that existed before the institutional change and estimated a fcr.d 
allowance for those animals that were pr<viously unenclosed and that would now have to 
be put behind fences. We subtracted the value of this feed from the net profit of the 
aforementioned crops. Sine~ farmers would need to tnaintain fewer ft-nccs under che 
closed-range policy, we calculated the approximate coSI of replacing broken fences 
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TABLES 
DEl'INrrJONS, MEANs, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS oF VARIABLES 
RlR MULTII'U! RroRESSION ANALYSIS 
Variable Name 
Dependent Variables 
Fence 
Stock 
Abstain 
Variable Definition 
Percent of eligible voteiS 
for fence law 
Percent of eligible voteiS 
for stock law 
Percent of eligible voteiS 
not voting in stock-law 
referendum 
Independent Variables 
Sw:-llmlREST THESIS 
Forest Percent of fann acreage 
in forest 
Savings Percent of farms 
estimated to save money 
with the stock law 
Cuss-coNR.Jcr THEsiS 
Tenants Percent of household 
. heads sharecroppers or 
renters 
Labore IS Percent of household 
heads fann laboreiS 
Mean Standard Deviation 
42.4 18.5 
16.0 9.0 
41.6 18.5 
58.7 11.0 
34.5 11.5 
23.6 12.7 
21.3 14.6 
Land Value White land value divided 396.92 102.29 
by white voters 
coefficient, to detennine whether the order of adoption of the stock law was 
similar to that on our measure of savings. It was. Cmmting all the districts, 
the correlation is 0.56, which is statistically significant at the conventional S 
percent confidence level. Excluding those districts where the Cmmty Ordi-
around cropa and that around animala and added the difference between the two to the 
aavinga meaaure. Additionally, we auumed that Carmen would bear a one-time coat of 
erecting new fc:ncea around their nc:wly creatc:d paaturealf the atock Jaw were: pauc:d. At 
is uaual in auch economic indcxea, our nc:t aavinga mc:uure reprc:ac:ntathe diacounted net 
preaent value of theae aavinga over an Infinite time horizon. Following Roger L. Ranaom 
and Richard Sutch, o,, KinJ of FrmloJII: Til• Econo ... ic CoJUifWnm of Eao.uiptation 
(Cambridge, Eng., and other citlc:a, 1977), 208, we auumed an intcreat rate of 7 pcreenL 
For dc:taila ofthe calculation, aec: Kantor, "Property Righlll," 127-28 and 295-302. 
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CoMMUNITY AND 
Socw.-coN1110l. THESIS 
Gini 
Stkinfrc 
ToWN 'IHI!sJS 
Town 
TABLES Continued 
Gini coeffiCient for value 
of owner-operated farms 
Dummy variable that 
equals 1 ifthcdistridhad 
adopted the stock law be-
fore the referendwn, and 
Oolhcrwisc 
Percent of household 
heads reporting town 
residence 
0.45 
s.o 
2JJ 
0.07 
9.1 
Souacu: For vOlin& n:tuml, see T1blc 2. D111 on weallh 111d w11djusled IIUIIIba or polls were 
collected from tbc CaJTollllld Jlckson Counties Tu Diaests (Georail(}eplrllllcnt of Archives 
IJid Hislory, Atl111ta). All of tbc dlla were collccled from mlllUSCripl popu!llion IOd aaricullurel 
census re1111111. 
nary overturned the initially announced results, the cmelation is 0.79, 
which is significant at the 1 percent level. While these results do not prove 
that the self-interest model is cmect, they clearly lend support to it. 
We also petfonned an ordinary least squares multiple regression analy-
sis using county referendum returns as dependent variables and 
socioeconomic variables as independent variables. u7 Because theoretical 
notions (ours among them) are often rather vague and because it is rarely 
obvious just how to operationaliz.e a ~ we estimated equations with 
several different combinations of variables. TableS delineates the variables 
that we think give the most accurate and fair test of the various hypotheses 
offered by Hahn, flynn, King, and ourselves; Ill To determine the support 
· '" The fact, pointed out earlier, that the numbt:r of balloll In tht: courthouet: 
referendum wueo much taraer than th•tln the llock.Jaw rderendum In C.rroll Counly 
In 1890 juellf~ea ourdt:cbion lo cetimate the reare~~iOn equation• siven In T•ble Sin three 
lt:parate equation•, rather than by • lW<Htase procedure. On tht: fence queation in 
Carroll County, it b obYiouethat men did not lint decide whether or not to vote on 1he 
fence·law queetlon, and then whkh way to vole. lnt~ead, the 1wo dcclalona were made 
•lmulllneoualy. We aleo eetimated eimilar cquatlona with losit modeta. Since the reauhs 
paralleled thoae ueina ordinary leut aquare1 regre11lon, we diKUII the aimpler models. 
TeeiS to dctennine whether it waa appropriate to conaolida1e all the elecliona in bo1h 
countlee were alao performed. When included in equalionelike thoae in TableS, dummy 
variableethattre~ted the countiee •nd elec1iona aeparatcly chanse the reaulll in only one 
r~epect: in the non-pooled equa1lona, the coefficienJS on 1he 14borm variable arc never 
••snificant. Thle doee not change our overall inlerprelalion ala II. We did not add mililia-
district to countyWide-referendum returna bccauae, as we have arsucd at length in I he 
text, very different conaiderationa moved 1he voten In 1he two 1ype1 or clectlona. 
111 Nearly all the different specification• or 1he model aupported the inlerprelllion 
advanced in the text. For inat.ance, in Table 6, eubsli1u1ins 1he perccntaae of farm• 
le~antcd in each dinrict for the percent.aae of tenaniS a mona houet:hold head• changee 
~enher a eign of any coeffiCient nor the identiliee of the variablu that are natinically 
••gnilicant at the conventional .OS level. Funhermore, eupplantins the percentage 
reeiding in town• with the value of town real e11a1e per capha or 1he pcrccnt.age of fore a I 
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for the fence- and stock-law positions among all potential voters in the 
seven cmmtywide referenda in the two coWlties, we divided the number of 
votes for each side in each militia district by the estimated number of polls 
in each district. 139 
Although the definitions of most of the independent variables are self-
evident, the rationale for each needs explanation. Two or perhaps three 
variables tap somewhat different facets of self-interest among farmers. The 
more Wlirnproved forest land each district had, the more wood was avail-
able for fences, and the more room animals had to roam without intruding 
on crop land or garden plots. Consequently, the district's voters should 
have been less enthusiastic. about the stock law than in more developed 
areas. Similarly, the higher the proportion of farmers who, according to our 
calculations, should have expected to save money as a result of the passage 
of the stock law and the lower the proportion of farmers who should have 
expected to lose money, the greater should have been support for the 
change. . 
A third variable, the value of white-owned farm real estate from the tax 
digest divided by the number of white male voters in each district, partly 
indexes self-interest and partly indicates class conflict. 140 Those who owned 
either land convenient to railroad stations and markets or notably ,fertile 
land, which was most suitable for growing crops and therefore most 
vulnerable to the depredations of animals, had the largest material interest 
in overthrowing the fence iaw. Conversely, those who lived in districts 
where the fannland was less valuable, and therefore relatively more suit-
able for livestock and less fit for crops, had a good deal to lose from the 
land wilh the percentage of Jilled land does not change any signs or significance: levels. 
Only sets of independent variable• I hat are highly interrc:laled give appreciably different 
resuhs than those in Table 6. Because it is always d ifficult to inlerpret the paramelen of 
slrongly collinear independent variables, we em1>loy a set of variablc:a that captured 
different facets of each explanation. It is, of course, possible that we err in our 
opcrationalizalion of hypotheses. If so, our explicit and exact formul3tion of them may 
stimulate productive debate if others propose and test alternative empirical models. As 
has been widely noted, two of the chief vinues of quantitative socialscientilic history are 
the clarity that it forces and ita tendency to channel debate towards questions ami 
techniques thai allow definitive answen. 
111 We adjusted the number ofpoUs reported in the county taxdigeus upward for each 
district because a comparison of data from the tax rolls with the 1880 manuscript census 
ntnnben of males over 21 in each county indicated that the tax assessors, who were 
supposed to assess even the propertyless, missed about 45 percelll of the black and 23 
percent of the white male household heads in Carroll County aud 30 percent of the: black 
and 19!>c:rcent of the: white male household heads in jackson County. Since the published 
1890 census does not give the number of males over 21 by minor civil division and the 
manuscripts for that census burned, we were forced to usc the tax digest number of polls 
for each district for each election year, and we had to inOale every dislrict's number of 
polls by the percentages for the whole county, given above. 
110 Because, as Table I above shows, only about5 percent of black household heads in 
the two count ies owned farms (and their farms probably had disproportionately low 
values). we: excluded blacks from the numentor and denominator of this statistic. 
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stock law, at least in the short tenn. Nonetheless, beca~ this variable also 
scales fanners and townspeople into the relatively rich and the relatively 
poor. it is also an indication of class conflict and fits into part of the 
hypotheses of Bonner, Flynn, and Hahn. We have therefore assigned it a 
position in Tables Sand 6 Wlder the "class-conflict thesis." 
Four variables express other aspects of the Hahn and/or Flynn models. 
Both authors hold that tenants and laborers should have feared the specter 
of social control that the stock law raised, as well as the material loss of free 
pasturage for their cows and pigs. Hahn believes that the "democratic 
commonwealth of producers" was strongest where wealth was most evenly 
distributed: "The districts lending the stock law its substantial support 
tended to have the closest links to market centers, the highest real-estate 
assessments and per capita wealth, and the greatest concentrations of land 
held by large landowners. It was here that merchants, big landlords, and 
other conunercial interests wielded most influence and authority. Poorer, 
rural districts having more evenly distributed landholdings, on the other 
hand, rejected the law overwhelmingly and at times almost Wlahimously. 
Here small fanners feeling the new strains of staple agriculture had their 
fumest cultural foothold. "141 Although Hahn offers no systematic evidence 
for this proposition, we tested it by calculating a Oini index of inequality of 
landholdings among owner-operators in each districl 142 The higher the 
index, the more skewed the distribution and, according to Hahn, the greater 
should have been the support for the stock law. Finally, if the fence-law 
controversy was a "central feature" of an "increasingly withering attack" by 
elites on "common rights," as Hahn contends, then one should expect the 
attempt to foster social control not only to persist but, if anything, also to 
gain impetus aftera district-level victory.143 To capture this idea, we created 
a "dununy" variable, that is, a variable that takes on the values of only zero 
and one. Calling this variable stkinfrc (for "stock law in force"), we set it at 
one for districts that had already adopted the stock law by the time of the 
relevant COWlty referendwn and at zero otherwise. If Hahn is correct, the 
denizens of stock-law districts should have tried to force their practices on 
others. 
The last variable, the percentage of household heads in each district 
living within town limits, stands for different notions for Bonner and Hahn 
than it does for us. 1be earlier historians saw the towns as outposts of 
capitalism or progress and change, and as opponents of traditional prac-
tices. While we largely agree with that description, we stress that 
townspeople, having less forest or common land and fewer animals than 
141 llahn, Rools of Southern Populism, 262 and 256. 
"'Onlh~ Cini index,~~~ Salya R. Ch~kravarly. Etltical Socialllldex NumbtrJ (Brrlin ami 
N~w York, 1990), 50. 
'"llahn, Rools of Soulhtrn Populism, 243. 
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rural Georgians, stood to lose little by the closing of the range and that they 
probably viewed other people's animals as nuisances. According to either 
hypothesis, town-<lominated districts should have opposed the fence law. If 
Hahn is conect and the bourgeois were aggressively trying to expand the 
sphere of market rel;aliuns, then they should have continued to do so even 
after their own districts accepted the stock law. The choice between the two 
interpretations of townsmen's behavior, then, lies not in the patterns of 
relationships of the town variable, but in those of stkinfrc. 
Table 6 largely buttresses our contentions. Those voters who stood to 
lose money if the stock law passed voted against it, while those who stood 
to gain voted for it, holding other variables constant Both coefficients of 
the savings variable are statistically significant. The positive and statisti-
cally significant relationship between the savings variable and nonvoting 
. implies that prospective beneficiaries sought to maximize only their own 
interest, which could be done without imposing the stock-law regime on the 
whole county. Since the extent of unimproved land is partially taken into 
account in estimating expected savings, as well as in land values, it is not 
wholly surprising that the percentage of land listed in the census as forested 
has no statistically significant relationship with the votes. The coefficient 
for the forest variable in the fence-law equation is, however, in the pre-
dicted direction. Together, these variables alone explain 16 percent of the 
variance in the percentage for the fence law. If the land value variable is 
considered as a measure of self-interest, the three variables account for 17 
percent of the variance in the vote for the fence law and 28 percent in that 
for the stock law .t44 As Hahn observes but does not sufficiently emphasize, 
"simple economic interest played a large role" in fence-law conflicts.t45 
If the value of fann real estate per voter is considered an indication of 
class conflict, then it implies that those in richer areas were more likely to 
participate in stock-law elections, all other things being equal, and were 
somewhat more likely to vote for the stock law than for the fence law. The 
data suggests that there was a palpable division between the white land-rich 
and the white land-poor over the fence law. 
Yet a simple two-class conflict model poorly fits the data from Carroll 
and Jackson Comities because group interests did not divide neatly into two 
parts. As our analysis of the competitive market for labor implied, tenants 
and laborers seem to have been largely indifferent between the fence and 
stock laws. In fact, the coefficients for the relationships between the 
percentages of tenants and laborers and voting on the issue have the 
opposite signs to those that the fence-law proponents' rhetoric suggested, 
, .. Thete percentages of variance explained derive from equations containing an 
Intercept term and the vari~bles UJ11ing. andfoml, in the first instance, and saving..Joml, 
and 14nd oolu• in the Kcond. 
, .. Hahn, RooiJ of Soullo1n1 Pol'ulis•, 268. 
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TABLE6 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SevEN CouNTY Rf.I'ERENDA ON STOCK 
LAW IN CARROLL AND JACKSON COUNTIES, OEOROIA 
IndependentVanabks Dependent Vuiabks 
Percent Fence Percent Stock Percent Not Voting 
SELF-INTEREST TIIESIS 
Forest 0.22 0.00 -0.22 
Savings -0.44' 0.16' 0.29' 
Cuss-coNRJcr THESIS 
TenaniS 0.43 0.17 0.26 
Laborers ·0.56' 0.04 0.52' 
Land Value 0.0009 0.030' -0.039' 
CoMMUNilY AND 
SociAL ·COiffl!OI. TUESIS 
Oini 0.24 -0.33' 0.09 
Stkinfrc -28.17' -4.84' 33.01' 
ToWN'IimsiS 0.36' • 0 II Town -0.48' 
itmRCEPr 59.73' 7.75 32.51' 
NUMBER Of 
OoSERVATIONS 92 92 92 
R·SQuARE 0.54 0.43 0.54 
NoTE: • - slalisiiCIIIy ll(lnificant al O.OS level. 
Souaa: See Table S. 
and the coefficient for the laborers was statistically significant at the 
conventipnal S percent level. Instead of turning out solidly for the fence law 
or the stock law, tenants and laborers appear to have abstained from 
voting. 146 
The regressioo results strongly diseonfum Hahn's cultural-alllftict model. 
AU other things being equal, the greater the equality of landholdings in a 
district, the stronger, not the wral:er, the support for the stock law, and the 
coefficient is statistically signilicant.141 That is, controlling for other fac-
•• Becauac African Americana In theae two countica were overwhelminsly but not 
entirely farm laboren, enterins the perc en lase or blacka in each disuictocparately inlo 
the equation lcada to problems of muhicollinearity. Since blacka were addreued in lht 
debale larsely in their economic, rather than racial rolea, we chose lo uoc the laborer 
rather lluon lhe black variable; but an equation aubalitulingthe black percentage (or the 
farm laborer percenlase produce• very aimilar reauhs. It is conceivable that black• were 
coerced to atay away from the polls, but there was no mention of this occurrins In rither 
coun1y. Since the Carrolhon CarToll F111 PriJJ did discuu charge• lhat Cowela Coun1y 
blacks had been encouraaed lo so lo a alate fair by alack-law auppotlen who feared thai 
blacka would vote Cor the fence-law aide, it ocem• likely lhat any auch event, In Carroll 
County at leaat, would have been noticed in the newapapcr. See Carrolhon CaJTotl Frtt 
Prm,July 16 and 25, 1886. 
1
" If the coellkient of varia lion (that ia, the slandard devialion divided by tl•e mean) 
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tors, areas peopled by relatively undifferentiated yeomen, the sorts of 
places where, according to Hahn, "preindustrial republicanism" thrived, 
were especially likely to favor fencing in animals. 141 And, as the simpler 
analysis of the voting already presented showed, those who lived in areas 
where the stock law had been put into effect through district elections did 
not seek to impose it on other parts of Carroll County. Instead, they largely 
abstained in the referenda, as did fence-law supporters in the same districts. 
Neither group acted as if motivated by a desire to thrust its value system on 
people in other areas or to protect a threatened communitarianism against 
hostile forces. Rather, they seem to have been responsive to their own 
rather narrowly drawn self-interest. 
Finally, as the earlier analysis of votes also showed, and as the hypoth-
eses of every historian who has examined the question predicted, townsmen 
strongly supported the stock law and opposed the fence law. Whether they 
did so to foist market relatiOns on yeomen or to keep hogs and cattle from 
running loose in the towns is a matter of interpretation, but, as the above 
analysis of the srkinfrc variable suggests, the latter is the preferable interpre-
tation. 
The fence-law struggle in Carroll and Jackson Counties, the centerpiece 
of one of the most striking and influential recent interpretations of postbellwn 
southern society, Steven Hahn's Roots of Southern Populism, does not 
represent, as he contends it does, an epic struggle between the aggressive 
agents of capitalism and the increasingly hapless defenders of a traditional 
cornmunitarian ideology or "moral economy." The astonishingly sophisticat-
ed debate on the subject, which anticipated many of the notions of modem 
economists, primarily concerned practical issues-costs, profits, conserva-
tion, and demographic change.149 Those who appealed rhetorically to 
for each dis1ric1 is substituted for doc Gini cocfficienl. th<: results ar<: almost <:xaclly th<: 
sam<:. Tht corrdation b<:tw<:<:n the two m<:asurcs of inequality for this set of data is •0.91. 
'"Hahn. RootJ ofSoulhtrn Populism, 253.11 turns out that in these counties,th<: districts 
containing villages had more equitably distributed la11tlholdings than did those in th<: 
most rural areas. This •ugg<:sts that the notion of an u11differentiated yeomanry in the 
outlyi11g areas should be: reexamined. 
149 \\'c saw no evidence that newspaper editors, who were always anxious to reature 
controversy in order to build circulation, ccnsor<:d the fe11ce-law side of the debate. 
Indeed. the editor of the jefferson FortJI NnvJ, T. S.lloward. declared (ibid., S~ptembcr 
19, 1879) that "we cannot tell whether this measure: (the stock lawJ would be b<:ndicial 
or not, e•pecially at this time. And, as we arc in no condition to form a correct opinion 
upon th~ sut~ect. we refrain from giving any, but offer our columns for a fair discussion 
of the 'Illest ion. and would like: to sec it ventilated. for we think no harm con be done in 
a [air and honest discussion of the benefits or evils that will arise from this measure. We 
shall stand ao impartial judge• in the maHer. and promise that both sidt• shall have a rair 
showing. We want our correspondents, lo start off witll, to give us tlu: opinions of their 
rc•pcctivc communities upon the sul1cct." In fact, the debate on both sides was 
rcmarhhly run and th<: number or articles on the subject was quite large. In any case,local 
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"ttaditional rights," as well as those who apostrophised "progress," often 
mixed these invocations with practical, calculating argwnents in their 
letters to newspapers. The persuasive tactics of both sides reflected the late 
nineteenth-century upcountry society's consensus on private property and 
individualism. Each side devoted many words to what tenants and laborers 
should have expected to gain or lose from the change because in a competi-
tive Jabot market, it was doubtful that this question of tort liability made 
much difference to the landless in the long nm. 
1lle results of both simple and more complicated statistical analyses 
support our interpretation of the debates and undermine Hahn's cultural-
conflict theory. Stock-law proponents did take advantage of the 1881 
legislature's district-option law to win gradually at the militia-district level 
what they could not pass in countywide referenda in either Carroll or 
Jackson Counties.1" Having achieved their aim in subcounty districts in 
Carroll County, stock-law advocates made little or no effort to shackle 
tinwilling backers of the open range in other parts of the county. Voters in 
districts where the objective economic benefits of the stock law were high 
were quite likely to adopt the new institutional arrangement .sooner than 
those where the benefits were lower or negative. Areas where landholding 
was most equitably distributed, the supposed bastions of yeoman indepen-
dence, actually were more likely to support the stock law than were less 
egalitarian districts, all other things being equal. Townspeople, as Bonner, 
Flynn, and Hahn all agree, favored fencing in animals, not crops, but their 
reasons were, we have argued, more practical than ideological. If these two 
counties were representative of the upland South in the late nineteenth 
newspaper storie• conotitute the best extant source for the ·policy debate, and all 
historians who have studied the iuue have been rorced to rdy on them. 
110 1nJacltlon County, six of the thirteen distrlcu adoJ>ted the otock law berore 1890, 
but instead or holding a countywide referendum, advocates convinced the legislature to 
impoae the otock law on the county in a special act, which was later declared unconstilu· 
tional . Gtorgio AciJ . .. 1889, No. 788, pp. 1278-79; Mathis v.JontJ, 84 Ca. 804 (1890); and 
Camp v. TompAinJ, 84 Ca. 812 (1890). It was eventually reimposed through still another 
legislative enactment. Giorgia llciJ .. . 1890-91, No. 12, p. 69, amended in G•orgio llriJ, 
1892- 93, No. 44, pp. 104-5. The lack of a local referendum arterdistricts began to act in 
Jackson County makes it much more difficuh IO determine the rorces behind the change 
there than in Carroll County. Hahn's statemelll in Tht Roots ofSouthtrn Populis,., 265, th•t 
the districts that imposed the otock law on themselves in Jackson County consisted of the 
towno of JciTerson and llarmony Cro••e "along with three of the wealthier districts" is 
misleading. (In fact, there were rour other districts that adopted the stock law in district 
referenda, along withjdrenon and llarmony CrO\·e- llarrisburg, Clarkeshoro, Newtown, 
and lloschton.) Sec JeffersonjacAJon lltrald, October 23, 1885, ami September 2 and 
November I I , 1887. Using total wealth per capita (the same indexlhatllahn uses) from 
the 1887 lax digest as a measure o£ wealth and excluding the two weohhy town distrir.u , 
the other rour districts that adopted the stock J.w in dist rict referenda ranked I, 3, 5, and 
7, while the districts that did not adopt the stock law before 1890 ranked 2, 4, 6, and 8-
1 I. The correlation is hardly overwhelming. 
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century.as Hahn implicitly claims, then the fence-law controversy in the 
upcoWltry was a struggle not of cultures but of interests. "1 
m Hahn, .R..u aJ SotiiMno ,..,..,.,., g.. I 0. 
A Rejoinder: 
Two Visions of History 
By SHAWN EvERm IV.Nroa and J. MoaoAN KoussER 
IN 1liE IJMJTB) SPAC2 AVAII..AIILB TO us, WE TAKE UP FOUR TOI'ICS: STEVEN 
Hahn's charges of mistepn:sentation, his statistical mislmdemtandings, his 
harsh personal observations, and his attacks on social scientific history. 
Hahn laments his inabiUty to "debate substantive matlers of interpretation, 
method, and argument" beca115e, he alleges, we "have so badly misrepre- · 
sented" his W<lrk, 71le Roots of Southm Populism, !bat he must "devote 
much ... attention to straightening out their misrepresentalions"(p. 244).1 
We made every effort to represent his pcisitioa accurately and fairly: did we 
fail? 2 
Hahn now claims that he did not sll'eSS cultural over material factors, but 
in his book, besides the passages that we quoted in our paper, he says !bat 
.. if adversaries fm the fence debate] crossed $Words over what GppUJTed to 
be purely economic COilCei11S, they imbued those concerns with tktptr 
cultural and ideological meaning" (Roofs, 250, OlD' italics). "The Popu-
lists, .. he asserts, "did not simply 'react' to economic stimuli. Ideas about 
justice, independence. obligation, and other aspects of social and political 
life, rooled in specific relationships and reftacted through historical experi-
ences, shaped their respomes to the postwar eta" (ibid., 6, our ilalics). He 
now claims not to lave used lhetenns "moral ~y" or"communitarian" 
(p. 244), apparenlly nieaning to imply that be puts f011b 110 "mml econcmy" 
interpretation. bUI in his book he employs such cl01e I)'IIOR)'IDS as 
.. ~Rindustrial republicanism" (Roou, 253), "the cooperative common-
wealth" (Ibid., 252), and "the democratic c:ammoaweallh of producers" 
(ibid., 262), and he cites, among others, J~ C. Scott's book, 1M MoraJ 
Economy of rhe PUUillll: Rebellion twl Sllb.sisrtnce in Sourhtast AsiiJ 
(New Haven, 1976), as support for his view, which is very much within the 
"moral eccnomy" school, that "popular movements nonnally begin as 
defenses of baditional rights, standards, and obligations" (.Roou, 269). 
Hahn now claims that he did not conJend that fence-law partisans 
"rejected eithd- the market or private property• (p. 245), but in his book he 
' 
• Pase I1UIIIbciS rar ..-u- 111 1111s -r ,_ Slcwn 11a11n, -cc.nmaa ea.« Histotlal 
Sense?• ue u-ta! puallhclicallylll lhc teaL We wioh Ia dl&llk Klm Bcmlr:r, Lanoe Davis, Doua 
~and David GJI:da for vat helpful CGIIIIIII:IIIs IJIId rd-,11111 111 rdlcvc lllcm ol' 1117 
ll:llpansibiljiJ ror lallailiin& -
'Wcapolop ror lcaYinJ DllllhcdllJBSiaourfustloaaq-liaoJ oi'Hahn ~Sease or 
c-nor.wcabh?" p.102). Sclmdll!w. bet......, Jbcworltina popc:r-.lonotlhc popc:r (whldo wciCIII 
1o blm> a lbc &:UIIUI one. r- c1o1s - clclclal. 
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says that the "nineteenth-century producer ideology," which he alleges that 
fence-law proponents shared, "challenged the hegemony of the market 
place" (Roots, 252): He now claims to oppose treating "the market" as an 
abstraction (p. 245), but in his book, he asserts that the Jacksonian hard-
money advocates "spoke for petty producers who feared the market's 
encroachments," while the Populist inflationists "spoke for petty producers 
who lived under the market's hegemony" (Roots, 192). He now claims to 
have "studied this conflict in most of the twenty-six counties in the region, 
not in only two of them" (p. 250), but in his book he states that "two 
Upcountry counties have been selected for very close scrutiny: Jackson 
County in the east and Carrt>ll County in the west" (Roots, 9), thirty of his 
thirty-four tables treat only those two counties, and he never discusses 
election retwns or debates in the stock-law elections in detail for any other 
counties. 
Halm now claims that he did not divide pro- and anti-fence-law support-
ers into two groups, but even in his reply he does. He asserts that it is "fairly 
obvious from no mote thaq a superficial examination" that the two sides 
consisted of "a coalition of landlords, planters, merchants, and other com-
mercial interests" against "yeomen fanners, tenants; and laborers of both 
races" (p. 246), and he alleges (incorrectly, we think) that "election returns 
render strong evidence for the 'two-class model' "(p. 249). 3 He now claims 
not to "have a 'cultural imperialist' thesis" (p. 254}, but his reply portrays 
merchants, landlords, and townspeople as believers "in the moral and 
economic superiority of commercial society [who] sought to hasten its 
advance" (p. 253), and in his book he wrote that, unlike stock-law advo-
cates, their opponents "never developed an organizational 
apparahis .... their resistance slowly collapsed when confronted by the 
superior resources of their foes" (Roots, 267). 
Perhaps most significantly, Hahn asserts that we have misrepresented 
the struggle over tort liability by divorcing it from its larger context in the 
"political economy of emancipation" (p. 249t and the "social, economic, 
and political transformation of the Georgia upcountry" (p. 253), and he 
reiterates the grandiose assertions about the nature and importance of the 
fence-law contest that he made in his book. Yet Hahn pointedly ignores our 
detailed argument that the debaters of the 1880s rarely if ever concerned 
themselves with such larger issues. They were practical people who dis-
cussed the costs aM availability of labor, timber, and land and the benefits to the 
'The: 5111011 qualiflcalions lhatllahn Jlllkcs forson1e blacks and tenants and his claim dat !niJ'IIfamily 
n:laliOJ~<Jtips might have played a role In d1e politics of dJ<: feuce debate no1 o•~Y support our more 
comt•lex picture of d1e aliJ!IUlltllls but also suggest dte Jtee:essily of a multivariate approach to sort dtc 
different influences. Quotallons In this r:s.<>~y from Steven llalm's Roou of Sourhtrn Populism an: 
indicated by Inserting RoofS followed by a page nwnbtr in pan:udlt.SCS following lhc: quotation. 
• Such a criticism Is partlcularly odd, for In his book.llalm generally ignores lhc: 20 percent of U~e 
po(•ulalion of U~r: two coontics who were African American and ronwJiicizcs upcountry poor while: 
loyalty lo lhc: Confedency as a struggle for "liberty and indepcudmcc" (RoofS, p. 132). 
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quality of stock and fertilizer, not the encroaclunents of market society 
upon their independence. Ahnost no one who wrote for the Jackson and 
Cam>U County papers explicitly questioned the justice of a system of 
"absolute private property," as Hahn's argument requires, and none en-
dorsed a single-tax or the notion that property belonged to the human or 
non-hwnan animal that used it. Stock-law partisans in Calroll County-in 
comments that Halm curiously does not quote, although he doubtless read 
the relevant issues of the newspapers-specifically disavowed any inten-
tion to impose the law on districts outside their own and, as we show, they 
carried out their intentions. Fwthennore, the effects of some of Hahn's 
most striking quotations, we point out, are undercut by parts of the letters 
that he fails to include or by the socioeconomic or political positions of their 
authors. An apparent call to a Populist revolt of the Wlderclasses takes on a 
rather different character when one teams that its source is a relatively rich 
stockraiser or a Democratic county conunitteeman; men whose names are 
traceable conunitted such class misrepresentation in numbers large enough 
to cast doubt on Hahn's implications.' More generally, if Hahn's analysis 
of the fence-law debate and referenda is wrong, then his larger interpreta-
tion is seriously called into question. Hahn has it backwards: facts validate 
or falsify Interpretations, not the other way around. 
Hahn largely ignores our detailed reading of the contemporary stock-law 
debate, which suggests that he realizes, at least unconsciously, that the 
upcounbytnen's discussion actually does not support his case. Instead, he 
spends most of the substantive part of "Conunon Cents" discussing statis-
tics-a remarkable emphasis for someone who obviously understands 
qualitative evidence much better than he does quantitative data and meth-
ods. To proclaim regression analysis an "ideological construct" (p. 244), as 
Hahn does, is to invite ridicule. Regression is, in fact, merely a statistical 
procedure, which has developed over two centuries in astronomy, genetics, 
and other disciplines and is widely used in the biological, natural, and social 
sciences and in engineering.6 Although based on certain asswnptions, as is 
every statistical method (even casual ones like Hahn's), none of these 
assumptions guarantees that a coefficient will have any particular sign or 
take on any particular value. Nothing about the technique predetennined 
that the signs and significance levels of the variables in our Table 6 would 
falsify Halm 's cultural interpretation. While our data may be imperfect, our 
models misspecified, or our operationalization of variables faulty, no one 
who rejects quantitative methods out of hand, as Hahn does, can usefully 
1 llahn begins his chlpceron lhe stock law with an 111li-stock·law qUOiation rrom Lindsay J.loncs, 
• Democratic county commillocllWI dwiug d1e fightagabiSI Populism dwiug the 1890s (Roors, 239). 
See note I 0 I in "Common Sense or Conunonwealth. • 
'See, ~.g., Stephen M. Stigler, Th~ II /.story ofStatl.stlcs: 71, MtiiSllrtmtm ofU,unainJy ~fort 
1900 (Cambridge, Miss., and London, 1986). 
262 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 
criticize particular statistical models or cany the debate further. By choos-
ing to remain ignorant about statistics, Hahn has not only closed himself off 
from any insights that might be available in much of the scholarship of 
social scientific history, political science, economics, and sociology, but he 
has also effectively conceded crucial portions of a debate about his own 
work. 
Some possible larger implications of Halm's anti-quantitative re-
marks, which are not spelled out explicitly, are also misleading. If 
Halm's vague conunents are meant to suggest that statistical analysis 
in general or regression in particular necessarily leads to politically 
tinged conclusions or that theories based on individual action auto-
matically do, then he is demonstrably wrong. For instance, on the basis 
of a largely statistical study, the economic historian Robert C. Allen 
concludes that the enclosure movement in England was not only unjust 
but that it was also inefficient. Yeomen, Allen's regressions show, 
practiced more capital-intensive farming than the gentry did.7 Using 
both individualistic and group models, the Marxist economist Michael 
Reich rejects neoclassical theories of racial discrimination in labor markets, 
and he employs regression and other statistical procedures extensively in 
arguing that racism hurts, rather than helps, white workers. 1 And another 
Marxist economist, Jolm Roemer, shows that rigorous mathematical mod-
els can clarify and iUuminate many of the rather vague concepts of Marxian 
economics. Not only can most of Marxian economics be modeled on an 
individualistic level, Roemer contends, but such an approach can also 
protect it from what he terms the "conunon error in Marxian discus-
sions"-functionalism.9 As these and many other examples show, 
mathematics and statistics are tools available to scholars of leftist political 
persuasions, a fact of which Halm, who does pot---or perhaps cannot-read 
such works, is apparently unaware. . 
Hahn's disdain for statistics is not merely a pose: he truly doesn't 
understand. For a generation, political historians have been employing 
regression analysis based on election returns aggregated by toWnships, 
precincts, counties, or states to estimate how individuals with certain 
characteristics voted. This technique, known as ecological regression, is the 
chief proce•fure used in a book that Halm claims to admire, where it is 
employed to estimate how blacks and whites voted, whether Populists, 
Republicans, or Democrats supported disfranchisement, whether the inde-
pendents of the eighties backed the Populist party in the nineties, and so 
'Robert C. Allen, EMiosartalld IM YtDitlall: 71rt Aarlcullurallhwlopmtlll oflht SHIIr Midlands. 
US~IB$0 (Oxfonl and New York, 1992), aspcclally 011ptcr 10. 
'Michael Reich, RacilliiMqiiDIIty: A Polilicai-Eco11omk Aooly.rU (Princdon, N.J., 1911). 
1 John E. Roemer, Ana/ylkal FoundaliotU of Marxian Economl£ 17~ory (Cambridge, Eng., and 
Olbcr cities, 1981 ), 1·9 (qiiOialion on p. 8). 
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forth. An article explaining ecological regression in detail, prominently 
refened to in that book, was published twenty years ago and is part of a 
large and continuing literature.10 We used exactly the same technique to 
estimate the voting patterns (including nonvoting) of tenants and laborers 
and the consistency from referendum to referendum of fence-law and 
stock-law supporters. Hahn, however, declares that there "is in fact no 
way" that we could have discovered "how tenants and laborers-or how 
any other individuals or social groups-voted" (nll) because only aggre-
gate data is available. He seemingly fails to realize that when he infers how 
groups voted by comparing votes by districts with averages of per capita 
wealth or percentages of landholders or whatever, he is making precisely 
the same sort of inference, only much less systematically. To be sure, there 
are interesting technical problems with ecological regression, but Hahn 
cannot consider them because he knows too little about statistics. In fact, he 
doesn't even recognize ecological regression when he sees it. 
Hahn's confusion about statistics also explains his misleading inference 
that men in Jackson and Carroll Counties must have "acted against their 
economic interests" (p. 256) because support for the stock law there was 
weak. For one thing, in the average district in these counti~, by our 
measure, only 34.5 percent of the farms could be expected to gain immedi-
ately by the passage of the stock law. For another, that measure, which we 
call savinsl 111 Table 6, was not the only variable in our equation, not the 
only influence on voting that we found. Unlike the informal comparison of 
averages of two variables at a time that Hahn employs (t.g., Roots, 257-58), 
multiple regression allows the simultaneous consideration of the separate, 
independent effects of several variables on a dependent variable, such as 
voting for the stock law. That is why it is called multiple regression. 
Another easily comprehended property of ~tistical techniques answ~rs 
another of Hahn's criticisms. Formal procedures such as regression explic-
itly include "enor" terms, which signify ~t estimates of relationshiJlS 
between variables are seldom perfect-especially when the variables mea-
sure human behavior. But so long a5 the c:t..racteristics that we are unable 
to measure, such as kinship ties in a particular place, do not vary systemati-
cally with other variables, the statistical estimates of the relationships 
between the variables that we can measure will be Wl8ffected. 11 Even 
1° Komsc:r, "FA:ol~~&ical Rcgn:ssion and dJC Analysis of Pal Politics." JoMriiDI of lnttrdistipliMry 
Hlslory,IV (Aui\Uim 1973), 237-62. f'Or a partial bibliopphicallisting oflhc: lilcnhorc, sa: Stq~"'" 
R. Grossbar1, "Quanli!ilivc and Social Science Methods for Historians: An Annollkd lliblingrai~'Y nf 
Selcckld Books and Articles." llistorital MttloO<U, XXV (Stmuncr 1992). 112. 
" liahn also gelS confused about some minor mailers in ·c.,.._ Sense or Commnnwe~~hh . • In 
Tablc2 imder"Twnoot in Percenl of Adull Malts,"79-62 equals 17(seellohn'sstalancn1Snn I'· 251) 
And dJC defmillon of a sample insures Lhat takina a 100 pcn:ml samplc-i.t ., the wholr.t"'l'"l•li• '" -
eliminates any problr.ms lhll ·~ ~ue pun:ly lo random or systemalic sunpli11B {see Jlahn' s st•lt1n<'nls 
on pp. 253, 257). (llahn samples every eighdo housclooW.) 
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though the most elementary statistics book or course explainc; such con-
cepts, Hahn seems unacquainted with them. 
Hahn treats our alleged commibnent to perfect marets and a neoclassi-
cal economic model in which individuals always maximize material benefits 
as ideological sins that biased our results. The allegation is baseless. In fact, 
as we pointed out in "Common Sense," the fence conflict arose precisely 
because markets failed: there were too many economically involved indi-
viduals-with strong incentives to misrepresent their preferences-for a 
non-governmental solution to work. Indeed, much of modem economics 
attempts to explain why markets fail and what to do about it. Furthermore, 
in "Common Sense," we did not merely posit that people acted in accord 
with their self-interest; we explicitly tested the proposition in the particular 
case. If the sign of the coefficients for S4vings in Table 6 had been different, 
we would have concluded that something else motivated the voters, just as, 
ih another paper, Kousser concluded that lack of support in regression 
equations for a self-interest explanation implied that people acted out of 
ideology. 12 In sum, although we do think that in certain circumstances, 
markets work pretty efficiently, we by no means assume that uncritically or 
uniformly.'' We try our best to let evidence, not political stance, determine 
our conclusions. 
' Hahn's unusually intemperate personal remarks deserve the gentlest 
answer that we can manage, short of silence. Because the ideas, research, 
computation, and writing that went into "Common Sense" were so shared 
that one person's contribution cannot be disentangled from the other's, the 
authors' names were listed alphabetically. Hahn's cheap" f "gibe unjustly 
belittles a diligent and original young scholar on the basis of egregiously 
speculative falsehoods. 14 Hahn could not possibly know whether his egotis-
tical fantasy that Kantor was "put to work" (p. 243) to refute him is true, 
and, in fact, it is not. Kantor was planning to write a dissertation with a well-
known economic historian, Lance Davis, when he took a reading course in 
political history with Kousser and discovered that fence laws posed a 
particularly interesting example of a developing topic, the study of property 
" Kousser. "Wily We~ Titere Block Scllools In doe Segregalcd Soollb? The Exil Ex1•lanalion 
R•·cooiSidertd." C.llrcll Social Science Working Paper 101 (July 1992). 
"Using !t'gRSSion analysis, Kanlor has argued lhal llbor markets around dte rum or lhe caalury did 
nol (tUJCiion as neoclassical d~rorislsiSSWllC. See Price V. rosltbackand Kllllor, "'Square Dear or Raw 
Oral? Markel Coml"'nsalion ror Workplace Disalllellllies, 1884-1903," Jour~~a/ of Economic llistory, 
1.11 (Da:anhcr 1992),126-48. 
"Kanlor, who had no parlin wrilbag dus paragraph, won dte 1991 Allin Nevins Prize given by lhe 
Economic llislory Assoclalion (or doe bc:sl disse11alion or lhe year In American economic lllslory. A 
review in dae AssociaUon 's jonmal slalcd d111 "In every respecl-lilerallue review, hypodoesls 
ronnalion,ISSidoous dala colleclion, sophisllcalcd bUiappropriale econornelrics, clarily or exposilion 
a11<l maiUrily or wrillng slyle, suhsla.nlive conlribullon-his Is a superb disserlalion. Jlricd lo ruad 
somcdaing wron& widt II, bnll c<Mald not" Robert A. Ma11o, "Commenlson IIanes, Kantor, and Owen," 
)OimiDI of Econo"oic History, Lll (huoe 1992), 466. 
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rights and institutional change, in a branch of economics known as "the 
new institutional economics." Following his intellectual interests, Kantor 
decided to pursue the topic, even though it meant signing on with a mentor 
outside his discipline, a chancy career move. As this decision suggests, 
Kantor is much too independent to order around, and he won a prestigious 
national fellowship that permitted him to work on the study on his own, 
rather tlwl being supported by grants to Kousser. 
Hahn knows that his ccntemptuous denigration of Kousser for specializ-
ing in scolding other historians for being unscientific is false. Many of 
Kouaer's papers have nothing to do with such criticisms, and Hahn has 
been sent more than one of them. And the logic of Hahn's position-that 
since Kouuer has crlticlud others, he must be wrong about me-need only 
be stated to be dismissed. As for spending "more than a decade of agitated 
effort and ... venom" (p. 243) to c:hallenge Hahn's interpretation, the truth 
is that as an editor of the Woodward festschrift, Rtgion, Rnce, and Rtcon-
stnlction, which was unrefm:ed, Kousser felt it his duty to offer suggestions 
for revision, and as a reviewer of Hahn's book, to deliver his honest 
evaluation. Despite arguments over evidence and interpretation, Kousser 
"liked" Hahn's contribution to the festschrift, "found It provocative," and 
never considered excluding il15 Does this sound venomous? Would a 
reasonable reader find our "Common Sense" as rancorous as Hahn's 
"Common Cents"? As for the challenge, this is hardly the first instance in 
which historians have disagreed. Indeed, in OW' view, reanalysis of qualita-
tive and quantitative historical evidence should be more conunon. It may 
save the profession from enors. 
Hahn concludes by dismissing us as "zealots" (p. 256), "haughty" 
(p. 257) quantifiers whose belief in "defmitive answers" (p. 256) and close 
attention to the incidents that he made so much of in his book "represents a 
step backward" (p. 258). Retreating behind the smokescreen of relativism, 
Hahn seems to imply that if there is no truth, then he cannot be wrong. To 
put the argument of his scattered, allusive remarks in four sentences: 
Everything is a matter ofideology. If you like Adam Smith, vote for Kantor 
and Kousser; if you like Karl Marx, vote for Hahn. Since all methods are 
imperfect, none is better than any other. Since all logic and evidence are 
theory-laden, choosing one historian's account over another is principally a 
matter of taste or politics. 
Such deeply cynical views deny the possibility of progress in knowledge 
and, therefore, ultimately, any hope of human bettennent. Far from "left-
ist," they are profoundly reactionary, and we reject them. We offer a 
different vision of history, at once more consonant with the careful, objec-
tivist practices of most mainstream historians and with the possibilities that 
"Kousser to IWut, December 30, 1980, ln Kousser's po&<eSSion. 
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social scimtific theories and methods affoni in the present and future. The 
core of our vision is a simple adage: Put your thesis at risk. To m, this 
maxim implies, first, that theories and hypotheses should be as precise and 
explicit as is feasible. Second, hypotheses should be carefully and honestly 
tested against other hypotheses. using the most powerful methods avail-
able, on qualitative, as well as quantifiable evidence. And, third, it makes 
sense 1o carry out such tests, because it is often possible to delenninc that 
one theory is beaer warranted by the evidence than another. In the case of 
the stock-law coniJOVersy in the Georgia upc:ounlry, the quantifiable evi-
dence is rich enough to allow clear tests between differeot hypotheses, and .· 
the outcomes of those tests are consistent with a close reading of the 
cantemporary debate. Far from belonging 1o a different historical epoch, 
the c:oncerm and lll'gUIJleDts of late nineteenth-century fanners, herden, 
and villagers in Jackson and Carroll Counties were similar to those ex-
pressed by some late twentieth-century economists. It Is therefore Hahn 
who is being "unhistorical"-and "uncritical" of his own presumptims-
whcn he caocludes lhat the two ens were markedly diffaenl in thought or 
action. Our th5is could have failed in two ways-the coefficients in Table 
6 could have had different signs or the debates could have contradicted the 
quantitative filldinp. But in fact, it passed both tests. 
Hahn's vision of history, however, preserves his fixed ideas from the 
danger of being falsified. Does he believe in a two-class model, or not? Did 
the upcountry bourgeoisie want to impose capitalism and dependency on 
yeomen, teDanls, and labarezs, or not? Did the fence-law penisaos act 
primarily out of a desire lo preserve a (ftindustrial culture, a c:ooper11tive 
commonweallh, or not? When his interpretation is questiooed, Hahn blws 
bis assertioos, lashes out with false and irrelevant Dd hotni1W11 Maarb, 
. caricatures theories, Castigates methOds lhat he does not understand, and 
ends by denying the possibility of verificatiaq or falsification ~ in 
principle. A theory of knowledge can't~ right, if, W1der it, a hypothesis 
can't be wrong. · . · . 
Historians must c:hoole between these two visions~ theSe two wa)'s of 
doing history. Our way is grounded in the lraditional hisklrian's faith that 
many facets of the past are bowable.lt enjoim diligmt, careful scholars 1o. 
use aU appropriate tools, including lheories and methods developed in the 
other social sciences. It encourages clarity, enlw!ces rigor, and invites 
revision. Hahn's way, doctrinaire politics dressed up in the fashionable 
skepticism of the moment, dismisses other social sciences out of hand, 
wilhout UJUIDalL It disdaim clarity, denounces rigor, and defies revision. 
Rather than fostering understanding and propss, it finally degenerates 
into epistemological nihilism. 
